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A Fiduciary Theory of Judging
Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota*
For centuries, legal theorists and political philosophers have
unsuccessfully sought a unified theory of judging able to account for
the diverse, and oftentimes conflicting, responsibilities judges
possess. This paper reveals how the law governing fiduciary
relationships sheds new light on this age-old pursuit, and therefore,
on the very nature of the judicial office itself. The paper first explores
the routinely overlooked, yet deeply embedded historical provenance
of our judges-as-fiduciaries framework in American political thought
and in the framing of the U.S. Constitution. It then explains why a
fiduciary theory of judging offers important insights into what it
means to be a judge in a democracy, while providing practical
guidance in resolving a range of controversial legal issues
surrounding judicial performance, such as judicial ethics at the
Supreme Court, campaign contributions in state judicial elections,
and the role of public opinion in constitutional interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION
Some fundamental questions of jurisprudence have been with us from
time immemorial. What are the qualities of a good judge? What are the relevant
normative guideposts that should constrain or inform interpretation for a judge
in a democracy? What are the sources of ethics for judicial behavior and
performance? Justice Cardozo started the modern conversation about the role of
the judge in American democracy,1 but no one has been able to complete it. We
have yet to uncover a satisfactory theory of judging that adequately accounts
for the diverse, and oftentimes conflicting, responsibilities judges possess.
Recent national controversies over the Supreme Court’s judicial ethics,2
campaign contributions in state judicial elections,3 and the role of public
opinion in judicial interpretation4 only underscore the growing urgency to
1.
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
2.
See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Professors Ask Congress for an Ethics Code for the Supreme
Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2011, at A2; Letter from Mark N. Aaronson, Professor of Law, Univ.
Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law, et al. to Judiciary Comm. on Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules for
Supreme Court Justices (Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on
_letter.pdf; see also Ashby Jones, ‘It’s a Mistake,’ Says Alito, After Discovering Disney-Stock
Oversight, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 1, 2011, 10:46 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/06/01/its-amistake-says-alito-after-discovering-disney-stock-oversight/.
3.
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009); David E. Pozen, The
Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2008); Sandra Day O’Connor, Take Justice Off
the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at WK9; Sandra Day O’Connor, The Threat to Judicial
Independence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A18.
4.
See, e.g., A Symposium on the People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809 (2006); Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
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clarify the role of the judge.5 This Essay seeks to break some new ground on
the fundamental inquiries surrounding judicial responsibility by proposing a
fiduciary theory of judging.
An adequate theory of adjudication in a democracy must illuminate the
nature of the relationship between judicial officers and the people they serve.
We know that judges owe certain duties to the litigants before them, and that
they also have some responsibility to “the state” for implementing its laws. But
responsibility to “the state” is impersonal—and democratic citizens may
reasonably demand from their judges attention and responsiveness. Democratic
governance ultimately consists of a series of relationships between rulers and
ruled, so even if judges routinely think of our government as one of laws and
not persons,6 self-government means precisely that laws must be traceable to
citizens. Canonically, it is for judges to “say what the law is,”7 but judges
speaking the law must be held accountable if their rulings stray too far from the
will of the people who authorize the judiciary to exercise this power in the first
instance. Yet how to think about the nature of this accountability, thereby
reconciling judicial independence with democratic responsiveness, is
perplexing exactly because we lack a developed democratic theory of judging.
Although judiciaries exist in all democratic systems, no consensus on the
proper relationship between the judge and “the people” has emerged. Are
judges best considered “representatives” of the people in some form,8 or are
they “agents” of the legislature—the real democratic representatives?9 Better
yet, perhaps judges are “trustees” of some kind: independent but loosely
constrained by precedent and the authorization to try to develop standards
slowly over time, subject only to impeachment or elections for accountability.10
Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1594, 1640 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)); Erwin
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013,
1017 (2004).
5. There has been a resurgence of interest in theories about judicial character and the role of
the judge. See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2006); DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009);
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK
(2008); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF
JUDICIAL DECISION (2008). For an engaging review of Powell, Posner, and Farber & Sherry, see Paul
Horwitz, Judicial Character (and Does It Matter), 26 CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2009) (book review).
6. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”). For a booklength meditation on this issue, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997).
7. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
8. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 389 (1991) (exploring whether judges are
“representatives” for purposes of the Voting Rights Act).
9. For one summary of an agency view, see Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative,
and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1566–70 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors at Bristol, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES (Peter J. Stanslis ed., 1963).
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The judicial role may consist of elements of each of these ideas, in a
constellation that has yet to be fully mapped. But can a judge be all three at
once? And does the fact that a judge is elected or appointed, or is part of the
state or federal system, change the analysis at all? The answers to these
questions may depend on whether the judge is presented with a constitutional,
statutory, or common law question.
Of course, it may be that there is no unified field theory of the judge.11
Federal judges appointed with life tenure may differ materially from purely
elective state judiciaries, who may themselves differ from appointed judiciaries
subject to nonpartisan or retention elections. Supreme Court Justices may differ
from appellate judges under their charge, who may differ from trial judges.12
An attempt to describe the judicial role in sufficiently general terms to
encompass judicial responsibility in a democracy may seem to be a quixotic
endeavor. Yet such a project remains worthwhile, possible, and perennially
interesting. We pursue that project in this Essay, suggesting an interpretive
framework that can refine thinking about the nature of judicial action, while
providing guidance on specific practical applications in judicial ethics and
judicial interpretation.
In what follows, we argue that there is a satisfying normative vision of the
judicial role that can orient members of the judiciary—and the academics who
study them—lost in this thicket.13 By turning to the fiduciary principle, we
uncover a new perspective from which we can better conceptualize the judicial
role. Translating the fiduciary principle of private law into a set of obligations
for state actors in public law is well grounded theoretically14 and has historical
11. For a recent evaluation of the “judicial specialization” literature, see Chad M. Oldfather,
Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847 (2012).
12. For an important argument that statutory interpretation practices should be calibrated to
judicial hierarchy and therefore differ among courts, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and
Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012). For an
earlier meditation on whether there can be unified theory in light of judicial hierarchy, see Barbara
Herman, Comment on Gavison, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1663, 1663–64 (1988) (“If social role defines
judicial virtue, one might well ask whether there is enough unity in the role across courts to provide
useful content to the term ‘good judge.’ If there are radical differences, then there is room to question
the transitivity of virtue from lower to higher courts.”).
The complexities that arise on account of judicial hierarchy and bureaucracy are not worked out
in what follows. We expect to pursue these features of the judicial system in future work. It suffices for
now to note that our theory of judging pitched here at a relatively abstract level will both be challenged
and further supplemented by practical design considerations that are central in constructing a
functional judicial system spanning thousands of people in a bureaucracy trying to dispense justice and
the rule of law.
13. None of the recent works on the judge, cited supra note 5, consider what can be
illuminated by understanding the role of the judge as a fiduciary, as we do here.
14. For some recent work that uses fiduciary obligation as a framework for public law and
public officeholders, see EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY
(2011); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010) [hereinafter Criddle, Administration]; Evan J. Criddle,
Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006) [hereinafter Criddle,
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provenance in the framing of the U.S. Constitution.15 Once this Essay makes
that translation for judges in the political system, it offers insight into what it
means to be a judge in a democracy: the judge-as-fiduciary framework
confirms features of judgeship that seem obvious and central to the job while
providing a useful normative benchmark to help guide some of today’s most
controversial debates about the judiciary.16 By rooting the role of the judge in a
centuries-old rubric that governs trusting relationships, this Essay sheds new
light on the basic structure of and justifications for liberal democracies.17
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the fiduciary principle as
it is applied in the private law, and then explores the virtues of conceptualizing
public officials as fiduciaries. Part II then applies the principle of the public
fiduciary to the judiciary, arguing that the fiduciary model adequately captures
key features of the judicial role; it also explores for whom judges are
fiduciaries, as well as when—and whether—elected judges occupy a fiduciary
status similar to that of their unelected counterparts. Finally, Part III focuses on
the obligations that bind judicial fiduciaries. The judge-as-fiduciary model, this
Foundations]; Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259
(2005); Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative Engagement with
Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178 (2012). In some sense, all this work is a spin on Paul Finn’s earlier
insights. See Paul Finn, Public Trust and Public Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224 (1994)
[hereinafter Finn, Public Trust]; Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in
EQUITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 131 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995) [hereinafter Finn, The Forgotten Trust].
But this work has gained some new momentum with the visibility of a recent article in this vein. See
D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013). For some warnings
about the perils of this translation exercise, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota,
Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91 (2013).
15. See Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General
Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 245 (2007)
[hereinafter Natelson, Judicial Review]; Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52
BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, The Constitution]; E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B.
Young, Public Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachment for High Crimes and
Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1975).
16. For one criticism of a “judge-as-fiduciary” model—though one limited to considering the
judge as a fiduciary for absent class members in a class action case—see Lisa L. Casey, Reforming
Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L.
REV. 1239, 1314–23 (2003). To the extent anyone has tried to specify this model as a general account
of judging before, there are three pages in a 1995 article that begins the process of thinking through
this idea. See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1330–
33 (1995). Idleman assumes that some will think there is something “unacceptably undemocratic”
about this theory, but we tend to think judges’ fiduciary status actually vindicates their democratic
credibility, as we explain below. Id. at 1332.
17. Although we do not intend to enter the fray on “virtue” or “aretaic” jurisprudence in what
follows, see VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008); Lawrence B.
Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178
(2003), it is possible that adherents of this account of judging might find something useful in our
fiduciary theory of judging. Indeed, the fiduciary principle provides a unique, institutional approach to
understanding “excellence” in judging with a specifically democratic lineage, traceable in the AngloAmerican liberal political tradition.
Whether the model here is useful in thinking about civil law regimes is a harder question, one we
do not attempt to answer in what follows.
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Part will argue, underwrites18 a judicial duty to avoid conflicts of interest (the
duty of loyalty); reinforces a duty to take care in deciding cases (the duty of
care); explains a basis for judicial immunities (an outgrowth of the duty of
care); suggests disclosure, accounting, and candor duties;19 and likely requires
judges to consider the people’s views about some matters of public concern.
This last lesson of the judge-as-fiduciary model can help adherents of
various forms of “popular constitutionalism” understand the mechanism by
which judges may, as an appropriate part of their judicial role, remain
responsive to social movements and public opinion.20 Popular constitutionalists
routinely argue that judges often follow the “court of public opinion” as a
positive matter,21 but they have been less clear about the ways in which the
partnership between citizens and judges ought to function. The public fiduciary
obligation of “deliberative engagement,”22 explained in Part III.B below,
illuminates how public opinion can become a legitimate source of authority.
18. When we say these prescriptions are “underwritten by” or are “supported by” the fiduciary
theory of judging, we mean only that these broad approaches find consistent and coherent justification
within the fiduciary model, not that they are perfectly determined by the theory. Theories rarely
determine results in perfectly specific ways; at least our theory here is not intended to work like that.
Thanks to Paul Horwitz for encouraging us to clarify this.
19. See generally Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008)
(discussing the concept of judicial candor and arguing for a strong principle of judicial sincerity). Two
of us have previously argued for the virtue of judicial candor, quite apart from any fiduciary duty. See
Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 47, 51 (2010), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/7/30/leib_serota.html. As we will
reveal here, that virtue may be a fiduciary obligation of judges in their opinion writing.
20. See Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 353 (2007); Michael Serota, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV.
1635 (2012).
21. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); Robert A. Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279
(1957). For some political science literature on judicial decision making and popular opinion, see
TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999); Barry Friedman, Mediated
Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596 (2003). This positive account of
“majoritarianism”—that the Supreme Court follows public majorities—has recently come under attack
in Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103
(2010), and has received some modest empirical support in Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does
Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 263 (2010). Our primary concern here is the normative valence to popular
constitutionalism—that the courts should follow public opinion.
22. Two of us have pursued the political duty of deliberative engagement elsewhere. See Ethan
J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Representation in America: Some Thoughts on Nancy Pelosi, Gavin
Newsom, Tim Johnson, and Deliberative Engagement, 16 GOOD SOC’Y, 1 (2007); Ethan J. Leib &
David Ponet, When Vermont’s, San Francisco’s, and Other Cities’ and Towns’ Constituents Call for
Impeachment of the President and Vice-President, Must Their Federal Representatives Listen?: The
Ethics of Representative-Constituent Relations, FINDLAW’S WRIT (July 26, 2007), http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/commentary/20070726_ponet.html. We develop this duty as a product of fiduciary
obligation in David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy,
91 B.U. L. REV. 1249 (2011). One of us has considered a similar duty, that of intelligible juridical
communication in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion-writing process. See Michael
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Ultimately, our judge-as-fiduciary model underscores, supports, and
advances features of both judicial independence and judicial constraint.
Although the methods of judicial appointment, cycles of partisan
entrenchment,23 impeachment threats, and judicial elections24 seem
independent sources of and causes for judicial accountability, once the judge is
understood as a fiduciary, traditional accountability mechanisms look different:
they are part of a matrix designed to enforce judicial fiduciary obligation. The
judge-as-fiduciary model, most importantly, reestablishes a fundamentally
democratic relationship between citizens and their judges.
I.
THE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE IN PUBLIC LAW
Although rooted in private law, the fiduciary principle has also been
widely employed to provide a descriptive explanation of—and normative frame
for—the relationship between the state and its citizens. In this Part, we discuss
the three constitutive indicia of fiduciary relationships developed in the private
law context. We then explain how these three indicia translate to the public
context. We also reveal the overlooked historical pedigree of the fiduciary
rendering of public institutions.
A. The Fiduciary Principle
A fiduciary relationship emerges in contexts where one person (the
fiduciary) has discretionary power over the assets or legal interests of another
(the beneficiary).25 Classic examples of fiduciary relationships in private law
include attorney-client, agent-principal, trustee-beneficiary, corporate
officeholder-shareholder, guardian-ward, and physician-patient relationships.26
In these settings (and others that the law treats as sufficiently similar to them),
Serota, Intelligible Justice, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 649 (2012). We apply the fiduciary duty of
deliberative engagement to the judiciary in what follows.
23. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).
24. See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
2047 (2010).
25. See generally Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (2012) (discussing the fiduciary relationship between a state and its
people in the context of armed conflict and international law); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary
Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235 (2011) (explaining the unique position of fiduciary relationships under
the law). According to Justice Wilson’s judgment in Frame v. Smith,
[r]elationships in which a fiduciary obligation have been imposed seem to possess three
general characteristics: (1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or
power. (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the
beneficiary’s legal or practical interests. (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at
the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 102 (Can.).
26. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1400 (2002).
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the beneficiary is vulnerable to the fiduciary’s predatory or self-dealing actions
yet must still repose her trust in the fiduciary. Private law traditionally imposes
substantial duties upon fiduciaries as a way of keeping them in line and
incentivizing them to prioritize their beneficiaries’ interests above their own.27
Three indicia mark the fiduciary relationship: discretion, vulnerability,
and trust. Discretion and vulnerability are, arguably, flip sides of the same
coin.28 Discretionary power vested in the fiduciary means the beneficiary is
always vulnerable to potential abuse through predation or self-dealing. For
example, Tamar Frankel observes that the beneficiary’s vulnerability is not a
function of an initial inequality between fiduciary and beneficiary in terms of
bargaining power. Rather, the beneficiary is vulnerable even if she is a wellinformed, sophisticated, and able negotiator: “The [beneficiary’s] vulnerability
stems from the structure and nature of the fiduciary relation” itself.29 This
vulnerability is not a statement about beneficiaries’ lack of autonomy or
agency. It is precisely to retain a modicum of autonomy and agency for the
beneficiary that the fiduciary is ultimately obligated to pursue the beneficiary’s
interests.
Owing in part to the beneficiary’s vulnerability and the fiduciary’s
discretionary power—and in part to the expertise the fiduciary often holds
(which is why she gets discretion in the first place)—the fiduciary relationship
must be founded on a substantial degree of trust or confidence.30 Trust
functions to economize on monitoring costs: fiduciary specialization makes it
difficult and costly for beneficiaries to monitor their fiduciaries. And because
the performance of a fiduciary’s responsibilities cannot always be measured
objectively, beneficiaries might harm the relationship by constantly looking

27. See generally LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW (2005); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW
FIDUCIARIES (1981); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 20 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69 (1962); J.C.
Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L. Q. REV. 51 (1981); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
28. See Fox-Decent, supra note 14, at 299 (“[P]ower and vulnerability are intimately related.
The kind of vulnerability at issue . . . arises on account of the fiduciary’s unilateral power to affect the
beneficiary’s interests.”).
29. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 810 (1983). For some recent work
attempting to build a comprehensive and innovative political theory from the relationship of
vulnerability, see Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60
EMORY L.J. 251 (2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 1 (2008).
30. See Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 682–84 (2009); see
also Higgins v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 143 N.E. 482, 484 (Ill. 1924) (“A fiduciary relation . . . exists in
all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and
betrayed. The origin of the confidence is immaterial. It may be moral, social, domestic, or merely
personal.”); Hoge v. George, 200 P. 96, 102 (Wyo. 1921) (finding confidential relationships to exist
where “there [i]s confidence reposed on the one side and accepted on the other, with a resulting
dependence by the one party and influence by the other”).
OF
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over the fiduciary’s shoulder.31 Constant supervision would undermine the
relationship, which works best when the fiduciary and beneficiary bond well.32
As a result, beneficiaries must ultimately depend on fiduciaries to undertake
their responsibilities in good faith and to forbear from exploiting them for
personal gain.33 Notice here that trust is also tied to vulnerability34: the harder it
is to monitor, the more acute the vulnerability, and the more pronounced the
required trust. Accordingly, the stringency of obligations imposed on
fiduciaries shifts as these indicia register at different intensities across the
varied landscape of private fiduciary law.35
Trust is constitutive of the fiduciary principle for reasons that go beyond
asymmetrical power dynamics and barriers to monitoring. Although many
fiduciaries enjoy their authority by dint of consent or express delegation,
neither implied nor express consent are essential components of the fiduciary
architecture.36 Most obviously, guardians who act on behalf of minors or
incompetents do so on the basis of trust reposed without consent. Across a
range of fiduciary relations, trust is presumed rather than earned or explicitly
conferred. Thus, according to the fiduciary principle, the fiduciary acts on the
basis of trust without the beneficiary necessarily doing anything specific to
confer it.37
The difficulties of monitoring notwithstanding, beneficiaries usually retain
the right to supervise fiduciary performance. However, these supervisory
rights—along with the stringency of the duties owed to beneficiaries—
underscore how much the fiduciary relationship varies from one context to
another. For example, in the legal agency context, most principals can intervene
at will and dismiss agents without notice, whereas dismissing a trustee for
malfeasance in private trusts or estates requires judicial intervention.38 It
31. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking—Some
Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985) (arguing that fiduciary law exists to avoid
having the beneficiary “looking over the fiduciary’s shoulder”).
32. See Leib, supra note 30, at 692–97.
33. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980).
34. The link between trust and vulnerability is a central feature of Annette Baier’s
groundbreaking work on the philosophy of trust. See ANNETTE C. BAIER, Trust and Antitrust, in
MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS 95, 132 (1995) (“When we trust we accept vulnerability to
others.”); see also id. at 133 (“Trust is an alternative to vigilance and . . . trustworthiness is an
alternative to constant watching to see what one can and cannot get away with, to recurrent
recalculations of costs and benefits. Trust is accepted vulnerability to another’s power to harm one, a
power inseparable from the power to look after some aspect of one’s good.”).
35. See Davis, supra note 31, at 23–34; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 432 (1993) (noting that duties deviate substantially
depending on which relationship is at issue); Smith, supra note 26, at 1483–84.
36. See Criddle, Foundations, supra note 14, at 126.
37. See Fox-Decent, supra note 14, at 263 (“[T]he law presumes that the fiduciary acts on the
basis of the beneficiary’s trust, though it is really the law rather than any particular act of the
beneficiary that entrusts the fiduciary with power.”).
38. See Criddle, Foundations, supra note 14, at 129.
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typically follows that where residual control rights are particularly weak, the
beneficiary’s vulnerability to predation is greater and, therefore, the fiduciary
must meet a higher standard of conduct.39
In sum, although the three indicia noted above define the fiduciary
relationship and consequent fiduciary liability, the quantum of discretion, trust,
and vulnerability used to trigger fiduciary obligation varies according to type of
relationship. Fiduciaries and their obligations are not all the same—guardians,
for instance, are not identical to corporate officeholders who are themselves
different from trustees.40 What is especially notable about the fiduciary
principle and its concomitant obligations for our purposes is how they relate to
policing opportunism and discretion in contexts where monitoring costs are
high and bonding is critical for the relationship to function.41 Remedies
ultimately tend to be supracompensatory in order to deter abuse.42 To lesser and
greater degrees, certain mechanisms can hold fiduciaries accountable, but all
these forms of enforcement are incomplete and rely, in part, on fiduciary
altruism. In the next Section, we show why public officeholders are
fiduciaries—and how the fiduciary principle translates to that relational
context.
B. Public Fiduciaries
Applying the fiduciary principle to government officials has an impressive
lineage. The notion that government keeps power in trust for its citizenry dates
back to Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero: sovereign institutions were thought to hold
citizens’ interests in a public trust, constrained by fiduciary standards.43 This
deeply rooted conceptualization was premised on citizens’ vulnerability to the
potential abuse of discretionary governmental power and on the citizenry’s
need to repose trust in its governors44 and public institutions, sometimes by
express delegation and sometimes without explicit conferral.45
Conceiving of state authority as fiduciary resonated with widely varying
cultures, from ancient Greece to Roman political thought and practice, and
ultimately to England, where it found its home in the common law.46 Seeing
39. See id. at 179.
40. See Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and
the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 910 n.48, 911.
41. See Leib, supra note 30, at 683.
42. See id. at 680.
43. See Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 15; Natelson, The Constitution, supra note 15.
44. On electors’ trust of representatives, see generally WILLIAM T. BIANCO, TRUST:
REPRESENTATIVES AND CONSTITUENTS (1994); DEMOCRACY AND TRUST (Mark E. Warren ed.,
1999).
45. As Professor Criddle has recently written: “All public institutions and officials . . . exercise
discretionary powers of an administrative nature over the public’s legal and practical interests.”
Criddle, supra note 25, at 1090.
46. See Paul Stanton Kibel, The Public Trust Navigates California’s Bay Delta, 51 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 35, 36 (2011) (“The origins of the public trust reach back centuries and millennium [sic]
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public officials as holders of a public trust reached America’s shores through its
colonial inheritance.47 In 1662, for example, King Charles II granted a royal
charter to the Governor and Company of the English Colony of Connecticut
upon trust for the benefit of settlers residing in that colony.48 And by the time
of the federal Constitutional Convention in 1787, state constitutions already
used fiduciary language.49
The founding generation understood the relationship between government
and governed as a fiduciary one—and those who debated and ultimately
adopted the Constitution assumed that it would promote fiduciary standards,
controlling the political discretion of officeholders.50 Predictably, then, the
Constitution makes ample reference to public trusts and to public offices being
“of [t]rust.”51 In drawing on Greco-Roman as well as Whig political
philosophy,52 the founders fashioned a government “whose conduct would
mimic that of the private-law fiduciary.”53 The Constitution was therefore
designed as “the fiduciary law of public power,”54 delimiting governmental
authority and directing it to the benefit of the citizen-beneficiaries.55
to old English and Roman law, yet the public trust continues to have far-reaching effects today
throughout the United States.”); Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 15 (describing Greek
provenance of public fiduciary theory); Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological
Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 69 (2009) (“The public trust obligation
is the oldest expression of environmental law, dating back to Justinian times and Roman law. Trustlike stewardship concepts have been central to indigenous governance back to time immemorial. The
public trust is manifest in the legal systems of many nations throughout the world.”) (footnotes
omitted).
47. See Joseph L. Sax, Introduction to the Public Trust Doctrine, in THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS: PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORKSHOP 5, 8 (Gary E. Smith & Alexander R. Hoar eds., 1999) (“[W]e developed the idea that the
states would take over the role that the king had played [as trustee holding the shared natural resources
in trust for the benefit of the English people] because, just as the king was the sovereign, the states in
America are sovereign. The law of England became the law of America. We imported the Trust idea,
but switched the role of the king to the state, and the state became the owner and Trustee for the
public.”).
48. Charter of Connecticut—1662, THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_
century/ct03.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
49. See Finn, Public Trust, supra note 14, at 224 (quoting the 1776 Maryland Declaration of
Rights); Finn, The Forgotten Trust, supra note 14, at 131 (quoting the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration
of Rights).
50. See Finn, The Forgotten Trust, supra note 14, at 135 (“[I]n the United States after the
Revolution, the fiduciary status of public officials followed inexorably from the embrace in that
country of the idea of popular sovereignty.”).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also Natelson, The
Constitution, supra note 15, at 1085–86.
52. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise: An Essay Concerning the True, Original,
Extent, and End of Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale University Press 2003) (1690). We explore the
Lockean vision in somewhat more detail infra Part II.A.
53. Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 245.
54. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 284–87 (2011).
55. Perhaps one might think of the founding generation as “settlors” for the trust.
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An important outgrowth of this fiduciary conceptualization is that
American courts can invalidate some laws and official actions that violate the
public trust, reinforcing the notion that judicial officers must hold political
actors accountable for their fiduciary obligations.56 In this regard, consider
historical legal doctrines, such as the public trust and Indian trust doctrines,
themselves explicitly premised upon a fiduciary conceptualization of
governance. The public trust doctrine embodies the fiduciary principle that a
sovereign government holds the shared natural resources of the polity, such as
navigable waters and the soil beneath them,57 in trust for the benefit of both
present and future generations of its citizenry.58 Based on this theory of
sovereign fiduciary obligation, state and federal judges alike routinely apply the
doctrine to prevent elected officials from allowing damage to shared natural
resources.59 As Mary Christina Wood puts it, “While the current environmental
laws give agencies control over natural systems and authority to allocate rights
to private parties to pollute and destroy resources, the trust serves as a
fundamental check on this authority.”60
Similarly, another direct application of fiduciary principles appears in the
Indian trust doctrine, which is “one of the primary cornerstones of Indian

56. In some ways, this is the same vision of judicial review expressed in Mary Sarah Bilder,
The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006) and in Natelson, Judicial
Review, supra note 15, at 281. Some U.S. cases that follow this general vision include United States v.
Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910); United States v. Kearns, 595 F.2d 729, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Fuchs
v. Bidwill, 334 N.E.2d 117, 119–20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W.
812, 815 (Minn. 1913); and Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 222–23 (N.J.
1952). As we highlight in what follows, much less attention has been paid to the fact that the judge is
just another public officeholder in a fiduciary relationship with the governed, requiring some
mechanisms to enforce fiduciary standards.
57. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (noting the state’s
fiduciary obligation to safeguard property “in which the whole people are interested, like navigable
waters and the soils under them”).
58. See Wood, supra note 46, at 45 (“At the core of the [public trust] doctrine is the antecedent
principle that every sovereign government holds vital natural resources in ‘trust’ for the public—
present and future generations of citizen beneficiaries.”). See generally FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE
ATMOSPHERIC TRUST (Ken Coghill et al. eds., 2012); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Mary Christina
Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and
Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91
(2009).
59. For application of the public trust doctrine in the federal courts, see, for example, Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1895); Illinois Central Railroad Co., 146 U.S. at 453; United States v.
1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 122–23 (D. Mass. 1981). For application in the state courts, see,
for example, Shepard v. State, 897 P.2d 33 (Alaska 1995); Arizona Center for Law in the Public
Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of
Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Ridenour v. Furness, 504 N.E.2d 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987);
State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1974). See also Wood, supra note 46, at 45–46
(“In the United States, the [public trust] doctrine is evident in hundreds of judicial decisions, including
landmark United States Supreme Court opinions.”).
60. Wood, supra note 46, at 68–69.
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law.”61 Like the public trust doctrine, the Indian trust doctrine is a product of
judicial craftsmanship designed to ensure that elected officials’ behavior aligns
with the public trust; here it is Indian tribes rather than the public at large that
serve as the relational beneficiary, with Indian land, resources, and way of life
held in trust.62 As the Supreme Court recently explained, the relationship
between the tribes and the federal government is best understood as “one
existing under a common law trust, with the United States as trustee [and] the
Indian tribes or individuals as beneficiaries.”63
The public and Indian trust doctrines thus demonstrate not only that
conceptualizing state actors as fiduciaries is a central feature of American
political thought,64 but also that it has entered actual public law doctrine.65
Although other areas of law besides environmental law and federal Indian law
have analyzed public institutions in fiduciary terms,66 what makes public lands
doctrine and Indian law helpful is that they show how the fiduciary foundation
of public authority is not just theory, but can be relevant to legal design, too.
61. Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2000)
(quoting F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707 (1987); United States
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97
(1942).
62. As Wood explains, the special beneficiary status afforded to the tribes is a historical
byproduct of Indian land transfers and federal promises of tribal sovereignty upon which they were
premised. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1495–96 (discussing the historical roots of the Indian
trust doctrine); Wood, supra note 46, at 71 n.146 (noting that the federal Indian trust doctrine is
entirely of common law origin and has no expression in the Constitution but has endured for two
centuries of jurisprudence).
63. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 11.
64. Canada’s relationship with First Nations is also conceptualized this way (as a “CrownNative fiduciary relationship”), which produces legally enforceable duties for the Canadian
government. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 14 at 55–74.
65. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court itself has suggested this much in the context of a recent
public trust doctrine decision:
[T]he power or control lodged in the State . . . is to be exercised, like all other powers of
government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the
advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private
individuals as distinguished from the public good.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1895).
66. See, e.g., Criddle, Administration, supra note 14 (discussing the application of fiduciary
principles in administrative law); Criddle, Foundations, supra note 14 (applying fiduciary principles to
administrative law); Criddle, supra note 25 (discussing the application of fiduciary principles in
international law); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J.
INT’L L. 331 (2009) (discussing the application of fiduciary principles in international law); Evan FoxDecent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301
(2009) (applying fiduciary principles in international law); Fox-Decent, supra note 14 (applying
fiduciary principles to state authority); Leib & Ponet, supra note 14 (discussing the application of
fiduciary principles in democratic representation); Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 15 (applying
fiduciary principles to constitutional law); Natelson, The Constitution, supra note 15 (discussing the
application of fiduciary principles in constitutional law); Ponet & Leib, supra note 22 (applying
fiduciary principles to legislators).
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The structure of the relationship between public officers and citizens
generally reflects the three indicia of private fiduciary relationships explored
above. This is because government officials have wide discretion in making
decisions that affect the interests and resources of their entrustors, irrespective
of the level or place these entrustors occupy in the hierarchy of government.
Citizens are, therefore, quite vulnerable to the potential abuse of such power,
yet have little choice other than to trust those who govern them.
The fiduciary rendering of state action also provides a useful counterpoint
to the conventional liberal account of legitimate democratic authority, grounded
in the consent of the governed.67 Ultimately, citizens of even the most liberal
and democratic of states rarely meaningfully consent to the state’s authority.
Simply casting a ballot—or declining to voice one’s protests by emigrating—
hardly confers consent on those officials or institutions ruling over citizens’
daily lives. And those officials who enjoy only the thinnest of consent of the
governed, whether because they are unelected bureaucrats or because 49
percent of the electorate voted against them—plurality election contest winners
can even have a majority voting against them—are difficult to explain or
constrain under traditional democratic principles. However, under the fiduciary
understanding of democratic state authority, a de facto relationship of
discretion, trust, and vulnerability ultimately grounds the range of fiduciary
obligations and the attendant political rights of citizen-beneficiaries.68 This is in
part why the fiduciary principle is so useful, attractive, and appropriate in
understanding state authority in democratic polities.
Of course, in understanding public officeholders as fiduciaries, one must
consider the differences between private and public fiduciaries. Translation is
one thing, but transplanting an idea from one category to another can lead to
category mistakes. Private fiduciaries, for example, often only make decisions
affecting the interests of particular charges: an agent for a principal, parents for
a child, a doctor for a patient. Yet public fiduciaries are generally asked to
render decisions for large classes of citizens whose interests may be adverse to
each other.69 This doesn’t turn out to be a very disruptive difference, however.
Multiple beneficiaries arise in private law too: Consider shareholders in a
corporation whose interests may collide. Or a class of beneficiaries to a will or
trust with members of the class having interests that do not align perfectly. Or
consider a set of claimants in a class action or aggregate litigation who do not
have the same incentives for settling litigation. Regardless of the context,
67. As the Declaration of Independence phrases it, only through the “consent of the governed”
are the “just powers” of government derived. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776). See also Serota, supra note 22, at 649 (“At the heart of American political theory is the
foundational principle that legitimate political authority is rooted in public consent.”).
68. See generally FOX-DECENT, supra note 14 (developing an account of state authority
constrained by fiduciary obligation).
69. See Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1103
(2008).
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fiduciaries are obligated only to act evenhandedly and reasonably toward all.70
Still, not all points of translations will be so smooth, and one must remember
that while public fiduciaries are similar to their private law counterparts and
ancestors in form, they differ in important ways.
Despite the risk that something may be lost in translation, in the past
decade, scholars have become increasingly interested in the application of
fiduciary principles to the public law domain, which has generated fresh
insights into areas as diverse as administrative law, constitutional law,
international law, and theories of democratic representation.71 In what follows,
we continue the project of understanding public officials as fiduciaries by
asking whether judges are fiduciaries, for whom they might be fiduciaries,
whether elected judiciaries differ from appointed ones, and what importance
any of this has for contested questions of judicial ethics and judicial
interpretation. Ultimately, understanding judges as fiduciaries clarifies much
about the judicial role and furnishes guideposts for how judges should engage
those over whom they govern.
II.
ARE JUDGES FIDUCIARIES? FOR WHOM?
With this background in place about the fiduciary principle and how it
illuminates certain features of public institutions, we are ready to inquire into
whether judges are fiduciaries. In this Part, we explain how thinking of judges
as fiduciaries is rooted in the American constitutional tradition and then
identify the functional argument for understanding judges as fiduciaries. Next,
we address three challenges that must be met prior to applying this
understanding in Part III. First, how does one regard the class of beneficiaries
that are protected by judges’ fiduciary status? Second, are both elected and
appointed judges fiduciaries? And, finally, as a bridge to our exploration of the
fiduciary duties of judges in Part III, we must ask about fiduciary
accountability in the judicial context: Given that judges are routinely
considered “enforcers” of fiduciary obligations, can we apply the juridical
conception of the private fiduciary to judges themselves?72

70. See Finn, The Forgotten Trust, supra note 14, at 138 (“It is uncontroversial fiduciary law
that where a fiduciary serves classes of beneficiaries possessing different rights . . . the fiduciary
is . . . required to act fairly as between different classes of beneficiary in taking decisions which affect
the rights and interest of the classes inter se.”); Fox-Decent, supra note 14, at 265 (“In the multiple
beneficiary contexts typical of public law, loyalty manifests itself as fairness and reasonableness.”).
71. See sources cited supra note 66.
72. To the extent others have used the fiduciary principle to develop an ethical framework for
governmental conduct, judges have been overlooked in favor of a focus on Congress and the executive
branch. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet? An Answer from
Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57.
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A. The Historical and Functional Arguments for Treating Judges as
Fiduciaries
From the beginning of the Republic, our Constitution’s designers
envisioned a judiciary that would resemble a form of public trust, a
quintessential fiduciary status. This conception is prevalent in both the
founding-era writings of the framers—particularly in the works of Madison,
Hamilton, and Jefferson—as well as deeply rooted in the British political
thought and the common law practices that influenced them. Consider The
Federalist’s most foundational articulation of the justification for judicial
review:
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority. . . . It therefore
belongs to [judges] to ascertain [the Constitution’s] meaning, as well
as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between
the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be
preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of
their agents.73
In this authoritative explication of the judge’s dual obligations of constitutional
and statutory interpretation, the judge’s job is to hold the people’s will in trust
and protect it from legislators who act as “agents” of the people.74 As a selfconscious design choice to protect the citizenry from the “agency costs” that
can result from delegating large governance tasks to political representatives,
legal authority is not only understood as a mode of keeping the legislature
within its bounded authority, but also as a mechanism for representing the
people’s will directly.75

73. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
74. For a more comprehensive exploration of legislators’ role as fiduciaries, see Leib & Ponet,
supra note 14; Ponet & Leib, supra note 22; Rave, supra note 14.
75. Because courts are also authorized through explicit acts of delegation by the people, there
is a debate about whether constitutional courts should be considered agents or trustees. See Karen J.
Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 33
(2008); Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU
Governance, 2 EUR. UNION POL. 103 (2001); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts and
Parliamentary Democracy, 25 W. EUR. POL. 77 (2002). Our characterization of judges as fiduciaries
supervenes over the agency-trusteeship debate, since both categories are quintessentially fiduciary. See
Leib & Ponet, supra note 14, at 183–86 (exploring this feature of supervenience). Some judges will be
closer to agents (arguably those tied more closely to electoral accountability) and others will more
clearly be trustees (arguably those with no electoral connection to their beneficiaries). But even those
with electoral connections to local constituents will be called upon to make decisions that require
consideration of people that have no right to vote for or against them; imagine a state elected judge
called upon to decide a federal constitutional question. In such contexts, the very same judges who are
usually agents will have to act as trustees. In all cases, in our view, judges are fiduciaries.
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That a judge holds the people’s will in trust is as true in the federal
government’s design as it is in state governmental systems, which often tie
judges even more directly to the people’s will through elections. As James
Madison argued in The Federalist, “federal and State governments are in fact
but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different
powers, and designed for different purposes.”76 All judges, state and federal,
fall within this ambit. In this vein, Thomas Jefferson observed that judge and
citizen are bound in a relationship of “confidence”;77 confidential relationships
are nearly indistinguishable from fiduciary relationships.78
According to John Locke, whose writings heavily influenced the founders,
the entire state apparatus holds the people’s power in trust. The judge, in
performing his or her role responsibilities is “to be directed to no other end but
the peace, safety, and public good of the people.”79 And when the people
delegate legislative power to political representatives, they “put the legislative
power into such hands as they think fit; with this trust, that they shall be
governed by declared laws.”80 An essential restraint on the authorization given
to legislators is that a legal authority will control their behavior with the
people’s interests held in trust. To be sure, Locke is principally concerned with
the trusteeship that the people’s legislative representatives hold—and the
people’s ultimate power to judge whether the trust has been violated.81 But
judicial power and legality can still be deemed delegated authority, and the
delegation of judicial office itself establishes a trust.82
The deep historical roots of the judge-as-fiduciary conception reach
beyond the realm of political thought and into the world of practice: a review of
British and American impeachment proceedings demonstrates the pervasive
application of this idea. The application of a fiduciary standard to impeachment
proceedings originated in England, where it appeared as early as 1640 during
the impeachment of Judge Robert Berkley.83 As E. Marby Rogers and Stephen
B. Young observe, Judge Berkley’s proceeding “evidenced the substitution of
76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 239 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
77. See KAHN, supra note 6, at 113 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William
Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), available at http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl269.htm).
78. See, e.g., Rieger v. Rich, 329 P.2d 770, 778 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (stating “a
confidential or fiduciary relationship . . . in law are synonymous”); Fipps v. Stidham, 50 P.2d 680, 683
(Okla. 1935) (“Confidential and fiduciary relations are in law synonymous.”); see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1314–15 (8th ed. 2004) (defining confidential relationships as a synonym of fiduciary
relationship).
79. LOCKE, supra note 52, at 157.
80. Id. at 160.
81. See id. at 208; see also id. at 166, 169.
82. See id. at 190 (expressing concern with “judicial censure or condemnation”). Rogers &
Young, supra note 15, at 1025–28, trace some of this Lockean heritage too, but they treat all
governmental powers as trusts without focusing on the fact that Locke had relatively little to say about
the judicial power and judges specifically. We make the relevant connection in the text above.
83. See Rogers & Young, supra note 15, at 1038–39 (citing Articles of Impeachment of Sir
Robert Berkley, in 3 COBBETT’S STATE TRIALS 1283, 1283–85 (Thomas Howell ed., 1809)).
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the public at large for the King as the primary beneficiary of the power held in
trust by governmental officials”—including, quite pointedly in context,
judges.84
This view of the judicial role as a public trust came from England to the
American colonies. In 1774, an early judicial impeachment proceeding in
Massachusetts focused on whether a judge’s behavior or other commitments
“violated the people’s right to judge the merits of their own agents.”85 Those
with oversight over the impeachment were clear that the judicial office is a
trust, requiring the promotion of the public good.86
A similar fiduciary standard applied throughout post-Revolutionary
impeachment proceedings as well. Since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution,
of the nineteen federal officeholders impeached, fifteen have been judges.87
Several of these judicial impeachment trials clearly treated those judges as if
they were fiduciaries. For example, when Judge John Pickering was impeached
in 1803–04, he was charged with acting “contrary to his trust.”88 Similarly, the
committee that helped impeach Judge Robert Archibald applied fiduciary
principles to his actions.89 Most explicitly, when the Senate considered the
impeachment of Judge Halsted Ritter in 1936, Senator William McAdoo (DCA) directly quoted a classic judicial opinion setting forth the fiduciary
standard from Meinhard v. Salmon.90 Judges, McAdoo argued, should abide by
“something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”91
Rogers and Young marshal still further evidence from other historical

84. Id. at 1039.
85. Id. at 1031 (recounting the impeachment of Justice Peter Oliver).
86. Id. (citing BOS. GAZETTE, Mar. 14, 1774, at 2, col.3).
87. See Complete List of Senate Impeachment Trials, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Senate_Impeachment_Role.htm#4 (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
We take no position here on whether impeachment is the only method for removing federal judges.
Compare Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, Removing Federal Judges Without Impeachment,
116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 95 (2006), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocketpart/constitutional-law/removing-federal-judges-without-impeachment/ (arguing that Congress is not
limited to impeachment to remove judges for bad behavior), and Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D.
Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72 (2006) (arguing that Congress can remove
judges through means other than impeachment), with Martin H. Redish, Good Behavior, Judicial
Independence, and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 116 YALE L.J. 139 (2006)
(defending the view that impeachment is the exclusive method for removal). Here, we simply
acknowledge the Constitution’s authorization of impeachment for removal of federal officeholders and
its relative popularity for removing judges (15) in comparison to senators (1), presidents (2), or
executive officials (1).
88. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 319–22 (1804). Pickering was ultimately convicted and removed
from office by the Senate.
89. See Rogers & Young, supra note 15, at 1044.
90. 249 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
91. Rogers & Young, supra note 15, at 1044 n.137 (quoting remarks of Senator McAdoo in
Senate impeachment trial of Halsted L. Ritter).
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impeachment cases establishing that evaluating judges under a fiduciary
standard was common practice.92
Contemporary impeachment trials demonstrate more of the same. For
example, Judge Harry Claiborne’s Articles of Impeachment in 1986 described
Claiborne’s tax evasion as a betrayal of “the trust of the people of the United
States” and characterized his behavior as violating several fiduciary
obligations.93 The most recent judicial impeachments of Judges Walter Nixon
in 1989,94 Alcee Hastings in 1989,95 Samuel Kent in 2009,96 and G. Thomas
Porteous Jr. in 201097 confirm that the general standard for impeachments is to
assess judges’ obligations as holders of a public trust.98 Finally, in conventional
trials against judges on basic fraud claims, courts have readily concluded that
judges who accept kickbacks or bribes violate a fiduciary obligation.99
The pervasive use of fiduciary principles in judicial impeachment
proceedings—and the more general historical pedigree of the judge-asfiduciary conception—is not surprising given the robust normative foundation
that undergirds it. As explained in Part I, three factors determine whether an
officer or entity is a fiduciary: (1) discretion or power delegated to a dominant
party over the legal interests or assets of another, (2) trust reposed to a party
with meaningful control over the legal interests or assets of another, and (3)
resulting vulnerability of the dependent party whose interests the party with
power and discretion represents. by this Assessed by these criteria, judges
qualify as fiduciaries.

92. See id. at 1042–44. They are more interested in impeachment standards generally than in
judges specifically.
93. 132 CONG. REC. 31, 493 (1986); 132 CONG. REC. 15, 495–96 (1986) (“Judge Claiborne
has violated the public trust. . . . [T]he judges of our Federal courts occupy a unique position of trust.”)
(statement of Rep. Rodino); 132 CONG. REC. 27, 765 (1986) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 477
(Alexander Hamilton) (Franklin Lib. Ed. 1984)) (“The ultimate issue in any impeachment proceeding
is whether there has been a violation of the public trust: A well constituted court for the trial of
impeachment . . . [is for] those offenses which proceed from . . . the abuse or violation of some public
trust.”).
94. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 2476 (1989) (statement of Rep. Sangmeister).
95. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 4227–30 (1989) (statement of Rep. Bryant).
96. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 7055 (2009) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
97. See 156 CONG. REC. 10,229 (2010) (statement of Sen. Levin); 156 CONG. REC. 8565
(2010) (statement of Rep. Schiff) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton)).
98. We did not undertake an analysis of judicial impeachments at the state level, though there
have been approximately ten cases of state judicial impeachment since 1785 (and about thirty-two
impeachment-related investigations). Since judges may be removed by multifarious methods at the
state level, standards for removal are more diverse. See Christopher Reinhart, Impeachment of State
Officials, OFF. LEGIS. RES. (Feb. 9, 2004), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0184.htm; Methods
of Removing State Judges, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth_impeachement.asp
(last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
99. See United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 803 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Castro, 89
F.3d 1443, 1443 (11th Cir. 1996). For analysis, see Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J.
CORP. L. 153, 205 (2008).
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To start, judges maintain wide discretionary authority. Judiciaries at both
the state and federal level are vested with the power to say what the law is.
Inherent in this delegation is a zone of discretion within which judges are able
to accomplish their judicial duty to uphold the rule of law in cases before
them.100 That discretion is conferred through institutional and cultural
independence, and a wide range of actions and reasons for action come
comfortably within judges’ authority. That judges have control over the legal
interests of both those who come before them and those whose laws they
interpret and apply is true by definition:101 they can put us in jail, issue
judgments against our property and assets, tell us what our constitutional and
statutory rights are, and remove our children from us.
Judicial power is also a form of entrustment. Trust enables the relationship
between judges and those over whom they rule to function properly, because it
is very difficult for those who delegate legal power to judges to monitor and
control a judge’s exercise of it.102 Those in whose name judicial power is
exercised cannot oversee judicial decision making easily because they lack
legal expertise. To the extent that many fiduciaries, such as lawyers, doctors,
and corporate directors, are experts of sorts,103 judges are expected to be
experts within their realm. Usually, the people in whose name decisions are
announced must take decisions on a kind of faith. Trust is necessary, too, for
citizens’ willingness to comply with the law in an ongoing fashion.104
100. “Discretionary control” by the state figures prominently in Fox-Decent’s important
argument for subjecting state officers to fiduciary duties. See Fox-Decent, supra note 14 at 294. His
argument should be—but hasn’t been—extended to judges.
101. It is not necessary at this juncture to specify with any precision the particular limits of the
discretionary freedom judges have, nor must we enter the fray in related scholarship about whether
judicial appeal to moral and social norms is actually improperly characterized as a form of discretion.
See generally MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982)
(exploring judges’ wide discretion); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive
Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975) (exploring the various senses
of “discretion” and explaining why the “no discretion thesis” is implausible).
102. Indeed, it isn’t clear that we want constant oversight. Even in jurisdictions with partisan
elections for judges, no one really envisions that judges are supposed to be subject to constant
monitoring on every case. In recent work focusing on legislator accountability (i.e., in a context with
electoral oversight), Jane Mansbridge has developed an argument for why we want discretion and
independence from those who govern us—even when controlled by direct and relatively frequent
elections. See Jane Mansbridge, A “Selection Model” of Political Representation, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 369
(2009).
103. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992). Still, many do not appreciate
that expertise is not a required qualification of being a fiduciary. See Paul B. Miller, Justifying
Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2083855.
104. This is a basic insight about governance in MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND
MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION (1998) and
Philip Pettit, Republican Theory and Political Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 295 (Valerie
Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998). Although conventional political theory has been comfortable
with this vision of trust in legislators and administrators, our contribution here is to extend the insight
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Finally, the delegation to judges of substantial legal authority to apply or
interpret the law leaves citizens vulnerable. Given the power and control judges
have over persons, property, assets, liberty, and rights, this vulnerability is
unavoidable. We are all vulnerable to judicial decisions that imprison us, take
our homes, fine us, take away our drivers’ licenses, tell us our constitutions
don’t mean what we thought they meant, and subject us to other coercive acts.
As the foregoing analysis reveals, the historical judge-as-fiduciary
conception rests upon solid philosophical footing, as evidenced by the
discretion, trust, and vulnerability implicated by the exercise of judicial
authority. In the remainder of this Part, we address some difficulties for and
challenges to thinking about judges as fiduciaries. We then turn in Part III to
the fiduciary obligations of judges.
B. Three Challenges
1. Who Are the Beneficiaries?
Before we can usefully apply a fiduciary model to the judicial role, we
must identify the beneficiary of the judge’s fiduciary entrustment. That
identification is nonobvious. When others have considered the judges-asfiduciaries model, some (including a few judges) have claimed that judges are
fiduciaries for class members in class-action lawsuits.105 This narrow window
into the judge’s fiduciary status is not where our argument is pointing,
to the judiciary as well, an extension supported by much of Tom Tyler’s work. See, e.g., TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
To be clear, trust is not really imagined here as a psychological state or an emotion that a
delegating party feels for the judge all the time. Rather, the fiduciary principle’s notion of trust is a
structural feature of the relationship at issue that facilitates ongoing willingness by a dependent party to
abide by the fiduciary’s decision. It is often the power itself, once conferred, that renders the
beneficiary in a position where she needs to trust, even if she is in a psychological state of distrust.
105. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We
and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action
suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of
fiduciaries.”); In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994);
Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975); Greenfield v. Villager Indus.,
Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973); In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061,
1064 (E.D. Mo. 2002); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 78, 82 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd.
P’ships Litig., 985 F. Supp. 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Feinberg v. Hibernia Corp., 966 F. Supp. 442,
446 (E.D. La. 1997); In re Quantum Health Res., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1997); In re
Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen,
Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1122 (1996); Judith Resnik, Money Matters:
Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and
Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2168 (2000); William C. Rand, The Role of the Judge
as Protector in Class Action Settlements, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 2002, at 27; Joseph A. Grundfest,
Attorneys Fees in Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation: A Proposal for Addressing a Problem That
Has No Perfect Solution, Testimony Presented Before the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of
Class Counsel (June 1, 2001) available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Witness%20
Statements/grundfest2.pdf. For a rejection of this model, see Casey, supra note 16 at 1318–23.
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however. Our historical and functional arguments are much broader and
suggest an even larger class of citizens requiring fiduciary protection from
judges. One needs a wider net to capture all those in the polity who have
delegated authority over their legal interests to judges, reposed trust in them,
and now remain vulnerable to judicial action. And in contrast to those
commentators who consider judges “trustees” for the “corpus of the common
law” and proceed to use such a status to derive certain fiduciary obligations of
judges to the “corpus,”106 our argument ties judges’ fiduciary status to those
actual citizens who have authorized and delegated power (expressly or not) to
them. In other words, in searching out the relevant beneficiary, one should look
to an actual relationship. The fiduciary principle is, as we have explained, a
rubric for those in relationships of power and vulnerability; for that reason, the
“corpus” is an insufficiently relational conception of the relevant beneficiary.
Rather, as our historical and functional analysis demonstrates, the
beneficiary whose interests the judge is supposed to be holding in trust is “the
people.” But “the people” is a vague and elusive entity that can vary by
jurisdiction. In some respects, “the people” exists only as a construction that
emerges when representatives of the people make assertions about the interests
and will of “the people.” Consider Paul Kahn:
In a modern democratic polity . . . [a] representational claim must be
made. That claim must refer to the people. Because the people do not
exist as a thing to be measured or consulted apart from the
representation, a claim to represent the people is always contestable.
One representational claim confronts another; none can be measured
against the people itself.107
But Kahn’s sometimes-too-constructivist vision—that the people have
virtually no opinion, will, or preference to consult prior to a political
articulation thereof108—is counterbalanced by his acknowledgement that a first
principle of democratic government is that the people are “the conceptual
106. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for
Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1639–40 (2005).
107. KAHN, supra note 6, at 200 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 204 (“There is no neutral
ground that shows the real people apart from the representation of the people. The people appear only
as an object represented. Do we see the people in the authorized representative or in the court’s
articulation of the rule of law [itself a representational claim]? Inevitably, we see the people in both.
There is always and everywhere conflict.”); id. at 206 (“[T]he contest of power in our democratic
political order is a struggle among conflicting claims to represent the people. No person or institution is
the people. ‘The people’ is an argument, an assertion of power, a claim to rule. The people show
themselves in and through a multiplicity of representations. The sovereign people is an object of faith
that creates a field of controversial claims of representation. Every such claim provides a point for
interpretation. In their total compass they constitute the interpretive debate that characterizes our
political life.”).
108. Id. at 210 (“The opinion of the Court is to make appear the opinion of the people.”); id. at
216 (“The opinion of the people is not a fact to be discovered either through current opinion polls or
historical research. There is not independent access to the ‘truth’ that makes an appearance in the
opinion. The opinion of the people exists nowhere but in the interstices of the ‘opinion of the Court.’”).
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ground of the authority of the judicial opinion” and that they are the
“foundation of the legal order.”109 Accordingly, since “the people” are both the
actual ground and foundation for what the judge does, a judge’s opinion can be
legitimate only if it plausibly represents the people.110 The opinion is, surely, a
representation. But the purely constructivist vision cannot be right on account
of the acknowledged ground and foundation for a legitimate democratic legal
order: the people.
Hard as it may seem to engage in the fiduciary representation of a class as
large as “the people,” democratic governance calls for nothing less. To say that
judges hold the public’s interest in trust is more than mere rhetoric or analogy;
the people are their real beneficiaries and judges should conform their conduct
to fiduciary standards. To be sure, in the standard case of a federal judge, the
American system of life tenure, concealment of authorship in opinions of “the
court,” and other design features can depersonalize the judge and render the
relationship of representation less visible.111 Yet it remains clear that the judge
is supposed to be representing the people112—and representing the people in a
fiduciary capacity. Although this form of representation may conflict with our
more typical associations of electorally rooted legislative representation, it is
equally compatible with conventional democratic theory. Judges speak and
apply the law, which is a democratic expression of the people. Judicial
representatives have discretion but must always act in the best interests of their
beneficiaries.
We present two caveats, by way of further explanation. First, although
rendering judges as fiduciaries personalizes the relationship between judge and
citizen (as a member of “the people”), the relationship could be rendered even
more personal by conceptualizing individual litigants as the relevant
beneficiaries or, alternatively, by treating litigants as immediate stand-ins for

109. Id. at 211.
110. See also PERETTI, supra note 21, at 84 (arguing that even when a judge’s representative
capacity is not enforced “via direct election, the link between the value premises of a justice’s selection
and then the value premises of her subsequent decisions is significant and consequential and
constitutes an indirect form of political representation”).
111. See KAHN, supra note 6, at 218.
112. The debate in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), about whether judges are
“representatives” within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is not exactly on point but is
still illuminating. The Court in that case—although limiting its holding to elected judges—more
basically rejected the view of an earlier case, which held that “it was factually false to characterize
judges as representatives because public opinion is irrelevant to the judge’s role; the judiciary serves
no representative function whatever[;] the judge represents no one.” Id. at 389 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court in Chisom ultimately rejected the theory espoused in Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion, id. at 404–17, that “judicial offices are not representative ones, and their occupants
are not representatives.” Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision in Chisom
certainly turned on the relevant judges being elected, but, as we explain infra Part II.B.2, elections are
not the sine qua non of the judges-as-fiduciaries theory.
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“the people.”113 At first glance, both of these approaches have superficial
appeal given the duties of impartiality that judges obviously seem to owe
litigants, in addition to the clear duty to listen to their arguments and give them
full and fair consideration.114
But these duties to litigants are not directly fiduciary, nor would creating a
duty only to litigants be consistent with our democratic theory of the judge. The
actual beneficiary really must be considered “the people” more broadly. The
litigant benefits from the duty owed to the public (and may herself be able to
enforce that duty, having legal standing to complain about a violation),115 but
the judge is bound by her office as a wholesale public trust. The office is not
granted and the judicial power is not authorized or delegated at the retail level.
When a judge is tasked with approving a settlement between litigants, the judge
must vindicate not only the parties’ interests, but also the more general public
interest.116
Of course, in most cases, judges focus primarily on the litigants before
them, not the people at large. But this doesn’t mean they check their duty to the
people at the courtroom door. Rather, the duty to the people reaches into every
suit: every fair and just adjudication between adverse parties is a way judges
serve the people. By discharging her responsibilities fairly and impartially, and
upholding the rule of law, the judge serves her beneficiaries. An arbitrator who
disposes of a dispute on account of a contract between litigating parties may
serve the “law” and have duties to litigants, but arbitrators do not hold the
judicial office in a democracy and therefore do not have a responsibility to the
people in the way judges do.117 For this reason, among others, when public
judges are too willing to serve as private arbitrators, they provoke outrage.118
The second caveat is that in connection with matters of statutory
interpretation—and judges do at least as much statutory interpretation as they

113. The rhetorical device in which the parts stand in for the whole is known as “synecdoche.”
Using synecdoche as a representation device in political theory is discussed and critiqued in BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 181–83 (1991). See also Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1997) (arguing that litigants before a court
participate in judicial rulemaking and lend legitimacy by acting as interest representatives of
subsequent parties that will be bound to those rules).
114. For more on duties to litigants, see infra Part III.
115. Thinking about it this way has the salutary effect of empowering litigants who are not
actual members of the relevant “people” (whether because they are fictional people like corporations
or foreigners) to still vindicate judicial obligations.
116. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
117. Thanks to Aditi Bagchi for the suggestion. The status of arbitrators when they have to
apply substantive law that incorporates considerations of the public interest—as in, for example,
domestic contract law or international border disputes—is an interesting question. But our model aims
to focus on officials holding public offices.
118. See, e.g., Randall Chase, Group Challenges Secret Court Arbitration in Del., BOS.
GLOBE, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/10/25/group_
challenges_secret_court_arbitration_in_del/.
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do constitutional interpretation and common law adjudication119—judges’
fiduciary relationship to the people is structured differently than it is in
common law and constitutional cases. This variance can be traced to the
conventional view that, in interpreting statutes, the judge is considered an agent
for the legislature120 and the legislature itself is supposed to be acting in a
fiduciary capacity for the people it represents.121 Although we will discuss
some of the consequences of this structure when we turn to specifying the
fiduciary obligations of judges in Part III, it suffices to note here that, setting
aside the difficulties of serving two masters as a fiduciary,122 judges cannot
abandon their fiduciary relationship with the people on the grounds that other
representatives are also supposed to be pursuing the people’s best interests in
administering the state. The checks and balances system functions only if each
branch takes its full set of fiduciary obligations seriously.123
2. Are Elected Judges Different?
Having clarified the relevant beneficiaries in the judges-as-fiduciaries
model, we must examine whether judicial elections at the state level change the
analysis. Although much of the historical and practice-oriented analysis above
focuses on federal judges whose “independence” from electoral accountability
would seem to justify their discretion and require a fiduciary model to reinforce
their accountability to citizens, judges are obviously selected in various ways
throughout the polity. At the state level, 89% of state judges face some type of
election: some face retention elections (42% of appellate judges and 19% of
trial-level judges); some face nonpartisan elections (20% of appellate judges
and 41% of trial-level judges); and some face partisan elections (33% of
appellate judges and 38% of trial-level judges).124 Although judicial elections
have traditionally been assumed to be sleepy, uncompetitive, and low-profile
events (with a few notable exceptions, such as the 1986 judicial retention
election in California when California voters refused to return three state
119. See Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, Op-Ed., Don’t Focus Solely on the Constitution,
USA TODAY, July 1, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-07-01-leib30_ST
_N.htm.
120. See Merrill, supra note 9. For the more sophisticated version that treats judges as
“relational agents,” see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319
(1989).
121. This is the core argument of Leib & Ponet, supra note 14.
122. See In re Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 935 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (“[A fiduciary] cannot
serve two masters, and if he has a conflict between his duty to his estate and his duty to his
corporation, he must resign or seek the direction of the court in advance.”), modified, 392 N.Y.S.2d
870 (App. Div.), aff’d, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977). We discussed this issue, supra Part I, at text
accompanying notes 69–70.
123. We intend to take up this issue in a future paper. See Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib,
Fiduciary Governance and the Separation of Powers (forthcoming 2014) (on file with authors).
124. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077,
1104–07 (2007); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and
Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1063–64 (2010).
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Supreme Court justices to their offices because of their prior decisions), many
recent judicial elections have been highly visible and effective methods for
influencing policy, mobilizing issue advocacy, and unseating judges.125 There
is also increasing concern about the potential disappearance of independence in
the states’ elective judiciaries because of recent campaign finance decisions in
federal constitutional law.126 However one ultimately evaluates the desirability
of judicial elections, these selection mechanisms implicate the relevance of the
fiduciary model of judging.
From one perspective, state judges subject to elections meaningfully differ
from their federal counterparts.127 Judicial elections help resolve the
“countermajoritarian difficulty”128 of letting presumptively unaccountable
federal judges contort laws passed by democratic majorities.129 State judiciaries
are likely more responsive and accountable to majoritarian preferences than are
federal judges in the average case,130 whether or not elections conduce to the
125. For some reflections on these recent developments, see David E. Pozen, What Happened
in Iowa?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 90 (2011); Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election:
Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118 (2011); The Schotland piece
examines the recent Iowan judicial elections particularly closely and explains important judicial
elections in 2010 in Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, and Kansas. Schotland, supra, at 119–20 n.3.
A more updated analysis would have to include closely watched judicial elections in Michigan and
Wisconsin. But even in 2008, Michigan judicial elections were “politicizing” methods of judicial
interpretation. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1808–09 (2010).
Two of us commented on these developments in Michigan in Leib & Serota, supra note 19, at 52 n.16.
More importantly, as Pozen astutely notes about the recent judicial elections in Iowa (though the point
could be generalized): “[t]he most profound impact of the ouster campaign likely lies not in its visible
effects within Iowa but in its invisible . . . effects on courts beyond.” Pozen, supra, at 98.
126. See, e.g., Joanna J. Weinberg, Citizens United and Judicial Elections, RECORDER, June 9,
2011, at 2. For a comprehensive report about the states’ reactions to Citizens United in the context of
judicial elections especially (written for California’s Assembly Judiciary Committee), see Carmen Lo
et al., Pub. L. Res. Inst., Spending in Judicial Elections: State Trends in the Wake of Citizens United
(2011), available at http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/judicial-elections-report-and-appendices
-corrected.pdf. Even before Citizens United, concern about judges’ behavior in light of special interest
funding of judicial elections was prevalent. See generally Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and
Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623 (2009); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms:
Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1348 (2010).
127. Rhode Island, like the federal government, appoints judges for life.
128. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress
to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 380 (2008); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153
(2002).
129. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1157–60 (1999) (summarizing countermajoritarian
arguments); Pozen, supra note 3, at 324. It is an odd fixation even on the federal side (does anyone
really think our legislative representatives are truly representative?), but that is a story for another time.
130. For literature regarding state judiciaries and majoritarian preferences, see generally Neal
Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered
Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1659–71 (2010); Amanda Frost &
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719 (2010); Joanna M.
Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169 (2009).
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perception of judicial legitimacy131 or actually justify different forms of judicial
review.132 Accordingly, one might reasonably think that the fiduciary model
provides a better account of the federal judiciary. That institution, by
constitutional design, appears more obviously to be a public trust of power
exercised independently and without regularized oversight or accountability.
However, as we’ll explain below, the fiduciary model captures something true
and interesting about both the federal and state judiciaries.133
Let us clarify, then, why the idea of fiduciary representation does not
preclude judges who are subject to election from being considered fiduciaries.
In short, elections do not affect the core indicia of fiduciary status: elected
judges are entrusted with discretionary power that renders beneficiaries
vulnerable. Although elections provide the beneficiary some residual oversight,
monitoring still remains quite difficult on account of asymmetrical information
and the inequality of expertise between judge-fiduciary and citizen-beneficiary.
Bernard Manin’s explanation of the logic of political representation is
instructive here: elections confer elite status and cannot abrogate the element of
superiority in the relationship between democratic leaders and the people they
serve.134 Even elected democratic rulers are fiduciaries, and, therefore, need
strict ethical parameters to control their power as fiduciaries. Just as elected
131. There is both an empirical and normative debate about whether judicial elections
reinforce or derogate from the public’s perception of the legitimacy of state courts. Compare CHRIS W.
BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 17 (2009) (arguing that
elections confer legitimacy), and James L. Gibson et al., The Effects of Judicial Campaign Activity on
the Legitimacy of Courts: A Survey-Based Experiment, 64 POL. RES. Q. 545 (2011) (finding that
elections enhance perceived judicial legitimacy), with Sara C. Benesh, Understanding Public
Confidence in American Courts, 68 J. POL. 697, 704 (2006) (arguing that elections harm perceived
legitimacy), and Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995) (arguing that judicial elections are inconsistent with the rule of
law and constitutionalism).
132. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001); Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in
Governance: Vive la Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273 (2005); Burt Neuborne, State
Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989); Pozen, supra note 24,
at 2083–86; Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from the
Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669 (1988).
133. Just because all judges are fiduciaries, it does not follow that all will necessarily have the
same ethical and interpretive obligations all the time. Compare Bruhl, supra note 12 (exploring how
different judges may have different interpretive obligations depending on where they are in the judicial
hierarchy), with Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1559, 1571–72 (2010) (suggesting that norms surrounding judicial interpretation are not affected
by selection methods). In a recent paper, one of us explores whether different selection methods could
support interpretive divergence. See Aaron-Andrew Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and
Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2012). As we’ve already suggested in Part I, see
sources cited supra notes 35 & 40, the extent and scope of fiduciary obligation can vary widely among
fiduciaries.
134. See BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 139–40
(1997) (“It is no accident that the terms ‘election’ and ‘elite’ have the same etymology and that in a
number of languages the same adjective denotes a person of distinction and a person who has been
chosen.”).
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representatives in the legislative domain should be held to fiduciary obligation,
so should judicial representatives.
The classic “voter ignorance” problem that plagues most democratic
elections in the legislative context135 is likely even more severe in judicial
elections because a meaningful understanding of judicial competence requires
special expertise and professional education. In judicial elections, voters
generally lack sufficient legal education and allow single issues to crowd out
other important information in evaluating officeholders.136 Although voters can
probably speak relatively clearly about basic social and moral issues, given
both the influence of out-of-state interest groups on judicial elections137 and the
reality that many judges have long terms relative to their legislative
counterparts,138 elections do not tell us all we need to know about the success
of judicial representation.
Moreover, some judges win office by local, district elections, even though
they adjudicate matters that affect state law generally. State citizens affected by
those decisions cannot participate in such elections, giving beneficiaries little
control over legal interests affecting them. Thus, given the considerable gap
135. See generally Ilya Somin, Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance, 22 CRITICAL
REV. 253 (2010); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413
(1998).
136. For some discussion about the ways in which political parties might ameliorate
knowledge deficits, see Ethan J. Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need
Popular Democracy and Popular Democrats Need Parties, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 69 (2012). The
usefulness of party signals suggests that partisan elections might actually be more normatively
attractive for judicial elections than nonpartisan elections. See Phillip L. Dubois, Voting Cues in
Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections: A Multivariate Assessment, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 395 (1984);
Marsha Matson & Terri Susan Fine, Gender, Ethnicity, and Ballot Information: Ballot Cues in LowInformation Elections, 6 STATE POL. & POC’Y Q. 49 (2006); Brain Schaffner et al., Teams Without
Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q. 7 (2001) (finding
higher incumbent effects and lower turnout in nonpartisan elections); Gerald C. Wright, Charles
Adrian and the Study of Nonpartisan Elections, 61 POL. RES. Q. 13, 13–16 (2008) (finding that voters
use less principled heuristics in nonpartisan elections). For some evidence that party cues in judicial
elections could be effective in getting voters to focus on relevant criteria, see Cindy D. Kam, Implicit
Attitudes, Explicit Choices: When Subliminal Priming Predicts Candidate Preference, 29 POL.
BEHAV. 343, 362–63 (2007) (reporting that party cues in judicial retention elections can eradicate
racial bias). But see Richard P. Caldarone et al., Partisan Labels and Democratic Accountability: An
Analysis of State Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, 71 J. POL. 560, 571 (2009) (finding that state
supreme court judges chosen in contested nonpartisan elections track median voter preferences more
closely than do judges selected through partisan races); Herbert M. Kritzer, Change in State Supreme
Court Elections: Is Voting Becoming More Partisan? (Univ. Minn. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 1129, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1879952 (arguing that a subset of nonpartisan
elections are becoming more partisan). Some recent analysis of this literature can be found in
Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties,
and Election Law, (Univ. Cal., Davis Law Sch., Working Paper No. 285, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010115.
137. See Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular
Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 27, 35–36 (2011).
138. See John O. Haley, The Civil, Criminal and Disciplinary Liability of Judges, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 281, 290–91 (2006).
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between meaningful accountability and the real practices of elections,
understanding judges as fiduciaries can serve an important function. Elections
are not an infallible moral touchstone;139 rather, they reflect only one blunt
mechanism for reinforcing one form of democratic control over public officials.
Even if judicial elections produced specific mandates from constituents
(and at least some decisions are probably rendered under some majoritarian
pressures), the relationship between judges and citizens would still be a
fiduciary one. If the state judicial role were more like an agent than a trustee,
the agency relationship is also paradigmatically fiduciary; indeed, the concept
of fiduciary representation supervenes over agency and trustee relationships.140
This is, in part, what is so powerful about using the fiduciary principle to model
governance relationships. Some officers are elected and some are not; some are
more agency-oriented and some are more trustee-oriented. Yet it is useful to
view all through a fiduciary lens. How we ultimately choose to enforce the
fiduciary relationship may differ according to whether a relationship is more
like an agency or more like a trusteeship,141 but they are all fiduciary
relationships. Agencies—especially judicial agencies that, even when subject to
election, do not really take on the character of at-will agencies in which the
principal can terminate the relationship without notice142—still embed a grant
of discretion in the original authorization. Judicial trusteeships, a relatively
intuitive way to render the federal judiciary, still allow for certain forms of
redress (impeachment) against those who act outside their authorizations or
engage in trustee malfeasance.
With this explanation of how elected and appointed state and federal
judges are properly modeled as fiduciaries, it is now easier to refine further the
relevant classes of beneficiaries. From one standpoint, the elected judiciary’s
service to “the people” might seem to be limited to their immediate
constituents. If a judge is elected from the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court in
Wisconsin, one way to draw that judge’s class of beneficiaries is by looking to
the population of Fond du Lac County.143 After all, Sheboygan, Portage, and
Outagamie Counties have their own judicial representatives.144 And on purely
139. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE
ENDS OF POLICY 34 (2002).
140. This argument is developed in Leib & Ponet, supra note 14, at 181–86.
141. See Criddle, Foundations, supra note 14, at 179 (explaining that “[t]he scope and potency
of a fiduciary’s duties to beneficiaries is directly related to the vulnerability of beneficiaries,” which is,
in turn, related to the strength of residual control rights).
142. For the provisions that control dismissal of fiduciaries in private agency and trustee
relationships, respectively, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10 (2006); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 (2003).
143. We’ll bracket for now whether “constituents” include those ineligible to vote like
incompetents, children, illegal aliens, and felons.
144. For a breakout of Wisconsin judicial elections by county in 2011, see Wisconsin Judicial
Elections, 2011, JUDGEPEDIA (Aug. 8, 2012), http://judgepedia.org/index.php/Wisconsin_judicial_
elections,_2011.
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local matters, this might make sense: the relevant “people” would be the
citizens of Fond du Lac.
But notice that if an elected judge in Fond du Lac has to decide matters
that touch upon the whole state—or the whole country—it no longer makes
sense to see her as a fiduciary only for “the people” in Fond du Lac. As a
practical matter, that judge would be motivated to pay more careful attention to
the preferences and interests of the voting citizens in her home jurisdiction. But
her responsibility and fidelity as a fiduciary demands that she also relate to a
much broader class of beneficiaries. If the federal Congress passes a law on
which she must speak, she cannot protect the public trust by caring only about
the interests of her electorate. Any elected state judge hearing a federal case
must pursue the interests of “the people” at large, even though that larger class
of “the people” did not elect her. This further reveals how elections don’t quite
reshape the essential role of the judge as a fiduciary. And just as a state court
hearing a federal case will need to expand the relevant class of “the people”
protected by fiduciary governance, so too when federal courts hear state law
cases, the class of “the people” to whom they must be faithful may also need to
contract.145
Before turning to an exposition of the general fiduciary obligations that
follow from and further buttress our judges-as-fiduciaries model, there is one
final challenge to our project that is worth exploring as an introduction to our
coming discussion of judicial fiduciary duties in Part III.
3. Do We Need Juridical Accountability for Fiduciaries?
A plausible reaction to this modeling of the judicial role might be that a
core feature of fiduciary law is to create civil causes of action (or the threat of
such) for judicial enforcement of fiduciary obligations to prevent fiduciary
opportunism. In other words, the fiduciary principle seems to be a juridical
one, which imposes judicially enforceable duties upon those who undertake
fiduciary administration or representation.146 If this picture is basically right, it
is odd to subject judges to fiduciary obligations, since they are usually tasked
with enforcing others’ fiduciary duties and enjoy absolute immunity from civil
liability for all acts taken in their judicial roles.147

145. For some evidence that regional factors have influence on federal district court decision
making, see, for example, C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 58–116 (1996). And for much more careful attention to complexities
associated with “cross-over cases” (when judges selected by one constituency have to interpret and
apply law produced by the representatives of another), see Bruhl & Leib, supra note 133, at Part IV.C.
146. Miller explores this idea, supra note 103, manuscript at 46–67.
147. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
356–57 (1978); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 111 (1913); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
523, 538 (1868). Much turns on whether an act is classified as judicial. See Peter H. Schuck, The Civil
Liability of Judges in the United States, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 655, 664 (1989). We discuss how these
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But viewing fiduciary principles as solely juridical constructs is
misleading in two ways. First, fiduciary law is not constructed only to
effectuate direct judicial review over fiduciary actions. Rather, the
reinforcement of the fiduciary principle through law is just one way to signal
and frame the more basic moral norms that the relationship triggers and that the
law recognizes. As a general matter, we tend to see large-scale compliance with
private fiduciary obligations because the norms are so deeply rooted and
function mostly extrajudicially.148 To be sure, fiduciary law applies when a
fiduciary defaults; but imperfect enforcement is common and expected because
it is widely assumed that fiduciary relations will fail if legal micromanaging is
excessive.149
Second, even without direct civil actions, the legal system can impose
fiduciary constraints on judges. Impeachments are the most direct—and
juridical—methods of enforcing fiduciary constraints against judges. In the
federal system, the Senate sits as a court of impeachment and can use fiduciary
standards for evaluating whether to convict and strip judges of their offices.150
Criminal actions against judges, adjudicated by other judges, are available for
substantial fiduciary malfeasance.151 In the jurisdictions that elect, recall, or
vote on whether to retain judges, these elections may very well be understood
as a means (albeit an imperfect one) of enforcing fiduciary standards against
judges. In such a rendering, the fiduciary principle is made “law” through a
portion of “the people” expressing their judgment at the ballot box.
Commissions, whether judicial or legislative, also oversee, investigate, and
discipline sitting judges;152 judicial performance evaluations, undertaken by
nineteen states (plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico), are also used to
supervise judges.153 All of these formalized mechanisms for framing and
reinforcing judicial fiduciary obligations augment more “informal” reputational
sanctions that are common in policing judicial conduct.154 And all of these
methods of keeping judges accountable can utilize fiduciary obligations as
immunities might actually be considered consistent with the standard private duty of care, infra Part
III.A.2.
148. For this general argument, see Leib, supra note 30 at 685–86; Lynn A. Stout, On the
Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can a Transplant Take?, in
GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA
OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 46, 47–48, 65 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003).
149. See Leib & Ponet, supra note 14, at 192.
150. On using fiduciary standards in impeachment proceedings, see Rogers & Young, supra
note 15.
151. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 464 (2004).
152. For a review of these, see Haley, supra note 138, at 288–90.
153. See Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Supplement
Inappropriate Voter Cues and Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 MO. L. REV. 635, 652–57 (2009);
Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Promote
Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200 (2007).
154. See Charles Gardener Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
243 (1993).
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baselines to evaluate, assess, and monitor for breaches of fiduciary obligation.
These retrospective enforcement mechanisms can also be supplemented by
using fiduciary ethical standards to assess an individual’s worthiness to hold
judicial office in the first place. Fiduciary standards are useful benchmarks for
more productive confirmation hearings, for more proper judicial election
rhetoric, and for appointments vetting.
III.

JUDGES’ FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
Having established the basic fit of the fiduciary model for judges in our
governance system in the previous Part, we now explore some practical
ramifications. In so doing, we specify the conventional fiduciary duties and
then translate what they mean for judges. Although the specific application of
these duties may vary according to a judge’s particular circumstances, the set of
judicial fiduciary duties that follow are widely applicable to all judges. From
the most basic aspects of judging, such as judicial impartiality, immunity from
civil liability, and legal research and opinion writing, to more provocative areas
of inquiry such as judicial ethics and the relevance of public opinion in
controversial cases, the fiduciary model illuminates the judge’s role in
American democracy.
We proceed first by applying the basic fiduciary duties to the judge: the
duties of loyalty, care, and a cluster of duties including candor, disclosure, and
accounting.155 We then expand outward to explore a fiduciary command
particular to those in public office: the duty of deliberative engagement.156 The
exploration in this Part reveals the extent to which the judge-as-fiduciary model
is already reflected in current judicial practices. And it also suggests some areas
where we might take the model more seriously in thinking about how to
regulate judges and how judges should behave.

155. One of us has already done the work of collecting cites and elaborating on this area of
law. See Leib, supra note 30, at 673–78. We draw from that article to introduce the relevant duties
here. In this context, we largely leave to one side the fiduciary “duty of good faith,” which might be
seen as a subset of the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of
Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 582–88 (2008); Letter from Deborah A. DeMott to
Ethan J. Leib 2 (Sept. 12, 2007) (on file with author) (“My reading of these cases [Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) and In re the Walt Disney Co. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2006)] is that they treat the duty of good faith as a subset of the duty of loyalty, clarifying that a
director’s duty of loyalty encompasses more than the negative duty to refrain from unconsented-to
self-dealing.”). For potential lessons from the fiduciary duty of good faith, see STEVEN J. BURTON,
JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992).
156. Two of us have already explained how the fiduciary duties for public officials amount to
a command of deliberative engagement. See Leib & Ponet, supra note 14, at 188–92; Ponet & Leib,
supra note 22, at 1256–61. We will expand this argument to judges in what follows and draw from
those articles to set up the argument for deliberative engagement as a fiduciary duty.

03-Leib-Ponet-Serota (Do Not Delete)

2013]

A FIDUCIARY THEORY OF JUDGING

6/5/2013 11:40 PM

731

A. The Basic Fiduciary Duties
Once two parties establish a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary becomes
subject to a standard set of legal obligations. These obligations are designed to
ensure compliance with relational expectations through some measure of
deterrence.157 Although the application of the set of duties that apply to any
given fiduciary relationship varies widely,158 the main duties can generally be
sorted under three headings: (1) the duty of loyalty, (2) the duty of care, and (3)
the cluster comprising the duties of candor, disclosure, and accounting. In this
Section, we briefly introduce each, and then translate what each obligation
entails for fiduciary judges.
1. Duty of Loyalty
The core fiduciary duty, applicable to all fiduciaries, is the duty of loyalty.
Loyalty, properly understood in the fiduciary context, amounts to a duty of
unselfishness. As Professor Lynn Stout observes, “The keystone of the duty of
loyalty is the legal obligation that the fiduciary use her powers not for her own
benefit but for the exclusive benefit of her beneficiary.”159 The fiduciary is
prohibited from engaging in self-interested transactions and is required to
pursue the interests of her beneficiary above her own.160 So “inflexible” is the
duty of loyalty that it requires a fiduciary to be “undivided” and “undiluted” in
her faithfulness.161
Translating the duty of loyalty from the private law to public adjudication
requires little effort, at least initially. The idea that judges ought to be loyal to
the citizenry is uncontroversial; their loyalty to their beneficiaries can be neatly
translated into a requirement that they remain impartial to the litigants before
them.162 Indeed, judicial loyalty and impartiality is the cornerstone of the
ethical commitment of judges, both historically and in the contemporary ethical
rules governing judges.
157. See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (2007).
158. See Smith, supra note 26, at 1483–84.
159. Stout, supra note 148, at 55.
160. E.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The concept of loyalty, of
constant, unqualified fidelity, has a definite and precise meaning. The fiduciary must subordinate his
individual and private interests to his duty . . . whenever the two conflict.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 387 (describing a fiduciary’s duty “to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all
matters connected with his agency”).
161. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989).
162. Notice that the duty of loyalty is generally owed to beneficiaries, but impartiality to the
relevant litigants is the most common way to “perform” the duty. Still, the duty of loyalty proper is
owed to beneficiaries who are not litigants. Cf. FOX-DECENT, supra note 14, at 163 (indicating that a
judge’s fiduciary obligation includes impartiality); Solum, supra note 17, at 186 (exploring how the
vice of judicial corruption is “not reducible to our concern that litigants get their due”). See generally
Matthew Conaglen, Public-Private Intersection: Comparing Fiduciary Conflict Doctrine and Bias,
2008 PUB. L. 58 (2008) (elaborating on what the author treats as an analogy between fiduciary doctrine
about conflicts of interest and judicial bias).
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For centuries, the paradigmatic judicial figure has been one of an impartial
arbiter dedicated to upholding the rule of law163—a conception that is also
deeply embedded within the American constitutional tradition.164 The U.S.
Supreme Court “has long recognized that the constitutional guarantee of due
process may require recusal of judges holding an interest in the outcome of a
case.”165 Most recently, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court went
one step further by holding that even the “potential for bias”—that is, not bias
in fact, but a “serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable
perceptions” violates the Due Process Clause.166 This holding derives from the
foundational principle that “[j]udicial integrity is . . . a state interest of the
highest order.”167
It is no surprise, then, that the first canon in the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges announces the judge’s fiduciary obligation of impartiality:
“An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should maintain and enforce high standards of conduct and
should personally observe those standards, so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved.”168 Canon 3 reinforces the
163. See, e.g., MAGNA CARTA para. 29 (“To no-one will we sell . . . justice.”); Deuteronomy
16:19 (noting Moses’ instruction to Israel’s tribal judges not to “take a gift; for a gift doth blind the
eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous”); Richard M. Esenberg, If You Speak Up,
Must You Stand Down: Caperton and Its Limits, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1287 (2010) (citing
THE VISIGOTHIC CODE bk. II, tit. I, para. XIX, at 28 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 1910) (“The Lex
Visigothorum . . . required that judges who had ruled falsely due, not to ignorance, but to partiality,
cupidity, or for the sake of profit would be required to make restitution to the wronged party.” ); Rick
Haselton, Of Judging and Judaism, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 483, 485 (2011) (noting that in Jewish
law it is well established that judges must be “incorruptible, and independent”); Thomas Regnier,
Restoring the Founders’ Ideal of the Independent Jury in Criminal Cases, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
775, 777 (2011) (noting the ancient legal maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria causa —that no one
should be judge in his own cause).
164. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“No
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J.
605, 615 (1947) (“Supreme Court Justices have from the earliest times disqualified themselves in cases
involving direct pecuniary interest.”); Stanley A. Leasure, Cash Justice and the Rule of Law: PostCaperton Financing of Judicial Elections, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 619, 642 (2010) (“The courts have long
recognized the impartiality of the judiciary as one of the cornerstones of our system of justice.”).
165. Esenberg, supra note 163, at 1288; see, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,
817–19, 820–25 (1986) (holding the Due Process Clause was violated where state supreme court
justice sat on a case while being a lead plaintiff in similar case pending in state lower court); Ward v.
Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 57–62 (1972) (finding a Due Process Clause violation where mayor
in charge of revenue production and law enforcement presided over petitioner charged with traffic
offenses, the funds of which, if paid, would go to fund the city); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514–
20, 531–32 (1927) (holding the Due Process Clause was violated where a mayor presided as judge
while receiving payment from fines he imposed).
166. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).
167. Id. at 889 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) .
168. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 1 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedStatesJudges/CodeOfConduct.aspx. The
reader should not confuse the references in the Code to the fiduciary as pertaining to our discussion
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view of the judge as a fiduciary subject to the duty of loyalty by emphasizing
the importance of judges’ remaining “impartial” and “faithful.”169 (The umpire
metaphor—controversies aside170—reflects this basic idea.) And the rules
governing state judges are similar.171 The fiduciary judge’s duty of loyalty,
accordingly, is deeply embedded in the American conception of the judicial
role.
And yet, the fiduciary duty of loyalty not only confirms what we already
know about judges, it also reveals where we fail to take impartiality seriously
enough. Take, for example, the recent controversy over judicial ethics at the
Supreme Court. Currently, the Judicial Code of Conduct is applicable to all
federal judges except Supreme Court Justices. No binding rules mandate when
individual Justices must recuse themselves from cases.172 Thus, whereas the
self-imposed recusal decisions of state court judges and lower federal court
judges are ultimately subject to Supreme Court review, no formal review
procedure exists for Supreme Court Justices’ recusal decisions.173 Taking the
fiduciary model—and its attendant command of impartiality—seriously,
however, would likely require that Supreme Court Justices be subject to some
recusal rules.174 The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty requires the utmost integrity
and lack of bias, regardless of place in the judicial hierarchy.
Another area in which the fiduciary duty of loyalty suggests that the polity
is not taking impartiality sufficiently seriously is in the context of the judicial
here: the Code explicitly discusses when judges take on fiduciary roles outside of their judicial role and
we focus here on the fiduciary character of judicial activities. See also ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (2007) (“An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to
our system of justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent,
impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of integrity, will interpret and apply
the law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of
justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges,
individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to
maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.”) (emphasis added).
169. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3 (2009).
170. See Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire
Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113, 119–20 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/03/03/zelinsky
.html.
171. As Professor Stanley A. Leasure explains, “state codes typically parallel the American
Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct.” See Leasure, supra note 164, at 640.
172. See Smith, supra note 2; see also Jones, supra note 2 (“Supreme Court justices make up
their own rules on recusal—or when they should have to step down from a case due to a perceived
conflict. In other words, they don’t have to answer to anyone.”).
173. See Letter to Judiciary Comm., supra note 2. However, when Justice Scalia chose not to
recuse himself from Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), notwithstanding a friendship
with Cheney, Justice Scalia did, in fact, issue a written memorandum explaining his controversial
decision. See Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.).
174. For potential frameworks, see Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 657 (2005); Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the
Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107 (2004); Noah M. Schubert,
Replacement Justice on the United States Supreme Court: The Use of Temporary Justices to Resolve
the Recusal Conundrum, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 215, 217 (2011).
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recusal standards governing elected state court judges. As James Sample and
David E. Pozen have pointed out, “Of the emerging threats to judicial
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality, perhaps most fundamental is
the influence of money.”175 The following statistics make this point clearly
enough: a recent nationwide study, conducted by Joanna Shepherd, analyzed
more than 28,000 state supreme court opinions from 1995 to 1998 and revealed
a correlation between campaign contributions and judicial outcomes.176
Specifically, Shepherd’s work found that “in partisan elections, contributions
from various interest groups have a statistically significant relationship with the
probability that judges vote for litigants that the interest groups favor.”177
Similarly, another study, conducted by Chris Bonneau and Damon Cann, found
that campaign contributions affected the outcome of cases in the Michigan and
Texas state supreme courts.178 Furthermore, a New York Times study of Ohio
Supreme Court decisions, which took place over the course of a twelve-year
period, found that Ohio justices resolved cases in favor of those who
contributed to their campaign 70 percent of the time.179 Finally, a study
conducted on Alabama Supreme Court decisions from 1995 to 1999 found a
close relationship between judges’ votes in a class of arbitration cases and the
source of judges’ campaign funds.180 As one state appellate judge skeptical of
campaign contributions rhetorically asks: “Can a judge accept campaign
contributions from attorneys or litigants with cases pending or likely to come

175. James Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More Rigorous, 46 JUDGES J.
17, 17 (2007).
176. Shepherd, supra note 126, at 628.
177. Id. at 669. Lest one think campaign money is merely following preexisting policy
positions rather than that policy positions are shifting to generate campaign money, Shepherd’s study
highlights that retiring and nonretiring judges show different patterns. As she observes, “[I]f the
relationship [between judges’ votes in favor of litigants favored by interest groups and campaign
contributions from those groups] was due merely to the campaign contributions permitting the election
of a higher proportion of judges who naturally already vote the way that the interest groups prefer, then
campaign contributions should have the same relationship with the voting of all judges, whether
retiring or not.” Id. at 674. But the relationship holds only for nonretiring judges, who still need
campaign funding. Id. at 673 (“[M]ost interest group contributions have no systematic relationship
with the voting of retiring judges.”).
178. Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, The Effect of Campaign Contributions on Judicial
Decisionmaking, 19 (Feb. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=1337668. In Bonneau and Cann’s study, the state of Nevada did not reveal a similar
connection between campaign contributions and case outcomes. But as they point out, this was at least
partly because Nevada has a nonpartisan judicial election system, whereas Texas and Michigan
employ a partisan election system. For a more comprehensive argument defending judicial elections
and finding relatively little empirical support for the notion that people are able to “buy justice” or that
partisan elections derogate from judicial legitimacy, see BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 131.
179. Sample & Pozen, supra note 175, at 18 (citing Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign
Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1).
180. Id. (citing Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002)).
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before the judge without at least subconsciously compromising his or her
impartiality?”181 Based on the foregoing research, the answer seems to be “no.”
Public polling data similarly reveal how campaign contributions in
judicial elections can detrimentally impact public attitudes toward our legal
system—and along these lines, recall that trust is an essential component within
the fiduciary architecture. As legal ethicist Keith Swisher highlights, over a
decade of opinion polling demonstrates that “a supermajority of voters,
lawyers, and even judges believe that campaign contributions influence judges’
decisions.”182 A range of studies reveals that at least 70 percent of voters
believe that campaign contributions influence the manner in which judges
decide cases.183 And in a 2002 judicial survey, 26 percent of 2,428 state trial,
appellate, and supreme court judges reported that campaign contributions have
at least “some influence” on judges’ decisions, while 46 percent said
contributions have at least “a little influence.”184 The same survey also found
that more than half of all judges believed that “judges should be prohibited
from presiding over and ruling in cases when one of the sides has given money
to their campaign.”185 Another 2004 survey, administered to New York state
judges, found that approximately 45 percent of respondents reported that
“campaign contributions influence judicial decisions to some degree,” while
nearly 60 percent reported that campaign contributions reasonably cast doubt
on a judge’s impartiality.186 In short, there is real public concern about judicial
partiality.
Yet in the face of such evidence, the rules governing recusal remain
surprisingly weak. In many jurisdictions, elected judges rule on their own
disqualification and recusal challenges; state court litigants face significant
181. Haselton, supra note 163, at 488.
182. Keith Swisher, Legal Ethics and Campaign Contributions: The Professional
Responsibility to Pay for Justice, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225, 238 (2011).
183. Id. (citing ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE: FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4
(2001), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults_6F537F99
272D4.pdf; Press Release, Justice at Stake, Poll: Huge Majority Wants Firewall Between Judges,
Election Backers (Feb. 22, 2009), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.
cfm/poll_huge_majority_wants_firewall_between_judges_election_backers?show=news&newsID=56
77; ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE COURTS 3
(2007),
available
at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_
JudicialSurvey/Judicial_Findings_10-17-2007.pdf; James L. Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Judicial
Impartiality, Campaign Contributions, and Recusals: Results from a National Survey (5th Annual
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, July 16, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641272).
184. Id. at 239 (citing GREENBERG QUINLAN, ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE—
STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 5 (2002), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/
media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResults_EA8838C0504A5.pdf); Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying
Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 463–66 (1988).
185. Swisher, supra note 182, at 239–40.
186. Id. at 240 (citing Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Court System, Commission Charged
with Scrutinizing Judicial Elections Practices in New York Proposes Landmark Reforms (June 29,
2004), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/press/pr2004_14_1.shtml).
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barriers in seeking campaign disclosure information; state court judges rarely,
if ever, have an enforceable obligation to disclose such information; and
appellate courts review recusal and disqualification decisions generally under
an abuse-of-discretion standard, which “has essentially cut appellate courts out
of the picture.”187
With this in view, we think that the duty of impartiality demanded by the
fiduciary model requires some basic reforms in the recusal process. Consistent
with Sample and Pozen’s recent recommendations, judges should probably be
required to “transfer disqualification motions immediately to a colleague
chosen by a presiding judge or the chief judge,” to disclose at the outset of
litigation “any facts that might reasonably be construed as bearing on the
judges’ impartiality,” and to apply a “per se rule for campaign contributors,”
such as the ABA Canon 3E(1)(e), which requires disqualification “whenever a
party, a party’s lawyer, or a party’s lawyer’s law firm has given the judge
aggregate contributions above a certain amount, within a certain time
period.”188 Whatever the precise reform package, the judge-as-fiduciary model
requires the adoption of laws that will ensure state judges remain impartial and
uphold their duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries they serve.
2. Duty of Care
The second core fiduciary duty is the duty of care,189 which generally
requires reasonable diligence and prudence.190 Although the duty seemingly
requires little more than avoiding negligence,191 most concede that it entails
affirmative obligations (unlike the mostly prohibitive duty of loyalty), requiring
reason-based decision making.192 Still, fiduciaries are afforded substantial
discretion in performing their responsibilities (the “business judgment rule” is
the most famous grant of discretion within the duty of care analysis193);

187. Sample & Pozen, supra note 175, at 22.
188. Id. Sample and Pozen also recommend that “all judges who rule on a disqualification
motion—whether for themselves or for their colleagues—should be required to explain their decision
in writing.” Id. We think that is also consistent with judges’ fiduciary obligation, though we would
probably classify such a reporting duty within the duty to account, infra Part III.A.3.
189. See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors of
corporations have a duty of care to their shareholders); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
123–36 (1986) (describing the duty of care in corporate law).
190. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401,
2420 (1995).
191. Thus some claim that the duty of care is not distinctively fiduciary after all. See Smith,
supra note 26, at 1409.
192. See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Robert Cooter & Bradley J.
Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1045, 1047, 1049 & n.8, 1062 (1991).
193. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) (explaining the business judgment rule).
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recklessness and gross negligence tend to be the standards as a matter of
practice.194
Like the duty of loyalty, the duty of care is already a part of how we
understand the judicial role. We surely expect judges to fulfill their
responsibilities with reasonable diligence and prudence and to engage in
reason-based decision making, while giving reasons for their decisions.195 The
duty of care incorporates judges’ responsibility to say what the law is and to
provide justice to litigants. Judges resolve disputes between litigating parties,
and they are required to execute that job with care, drawing their decisions
from well-founded authorities consistent with the rule of law. Although
litigants are not the direct beneficiaries of judges (as we explained in Part
II.B.1), they benefit when judges resolve cases fairly and in accordance with
the rule of law. Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges,
which directly instructs judges to “diligently discharge” certain responsibilities
and to “maintain professional competence” in their adjudicative and
administrative responsibilities, describes the basic duty of care.196
We also know well that judges have wide discretion in performing their
duties of care, consistent with a translation of the “business judgment rule,” as
applied to judicial business. This wide discretion serves well to explain the
robust immunities from civil liability judges enjoy within the scope of their
jobs,197 irrespective of how they are chosen or retained. To be sure, it is often
thought that the business judgment rule exists to enable risk taking by a
corporation’s management. But there is a corollary in judicial business: wide
discretion may enable judicial innovation by encouraging risk taking by judges.
Although matters of law are generally reviewable de novo, much review at the
highest courts is discretionary rather than mandatory, so many lower court
experiments stand even on matters of law; on matters of fact, of course, lower
courts receive considerable deference.
The duty of care not only confirms our model of judges as fiduciaries, but
it also directs our attention to at least one provocative area of reform. Beyond
demanding comprehensive and competent legal research, writing, and
194. See Scott & Scott, supra note 190, at 2423–24 (discussing the “business judgment rule,” a
presumption that corporate directors exercise due diligence, their fiduciary duties notwithstanding).
195. See, e.g., Finn, Public Trust, supra note 14, at 233 (discussing the public’s “right to
reasons” as a fiduciary obligation); Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, The Easy Core Case for Judicial
Review, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 227, 249 n.23 (2010). There is an extensive literature about when and
how judges may rely on religious “reasons” in their decision making—and the more general
intersection between public reason and private conscience. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995). We don’t mean to intervene in that debate here. We are
making the more pedestrian point that we expect judges not to be arbitrary or capricious. The notion of
that requirement as a function of fiduciary obligation is explored in Fox-Decent, supra note 14, at 266.
196. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3 (2009).
197. For a review of judicial immunity rules and practices in the United States, see Haley,
supra note 138, at 183–87; Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Immunity from Civil and Criminal Liability,
27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1990).
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supervision over litigation—things we already expect from judges—the duty of
care may raise important questions about the role that law clerks play within
chambers.198 Fiduciaries’ ability to delegate their fiduciary responsibilities to
others with much less expertise has real limits.199 The judge-as-fiduciary model
may therefore suggest that judges take more responsibility for drafting their
own opinions.200 Of course, the flexibility of the model will permit
considerations of docket management and the practicalities of running an
office. But the duty of care draws our attention to a basic feature of the
relational commitment judges, rather than their charges, owe the public; it
cannot be easily delegated away to those with substantially less experience and
accountability.
3. Duties of Candor, Disclosure, and Accounting
Beyond the two core fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are a cluster of
duties—the duties of candor, disclosure, and accounting201—that are routinely
associated with fiduciary obligation. These duties may take the form of
requiring doctors as fiduciaries to disclose their personal financial interests to
their patients (even when those interests are “unrelated to the patient’s
health”)202 or they may take the form of a more general “accounting”
requirement,203 which demands accurate bookkeeping to enable a beneficiary to
hold the fiduciary accountable. This cluster of duties improves the monitoring
process, which can often be limited in ensuring compliance.
When applied to the judge as a fiduciary, the duties of disclosure and
accounting accord with our basic expectation of judicial transparency.
198. See Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1100
(2004) (noting that he has occasionally seen opinions that look as though they were written entirely by
someone one year out of law school); Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND.
L.J. 1, 29 (1993) (“Today . . . the vast majority of judicial opinions at all appellate levels are drafted by
law clerks . . . . [Only a] tiny and shrinking minority of old-fashioned appellate judges . . . continue to
write their own opinions . . . .”).
199. See FRANKEL, supra note 54, at 130–31 (explaining the “duty not to delegate fiduciary
duties”).
200. There is a large literature about this subject. For a recent re-revisiting of this issue, see
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and Should We Care)?, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077 (2005); David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial
Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 555–67 (2001). Our purpose here is only to suggest that the role
of judges as fiduciaries puts a thumb on the scales in this debate.
201. See Jordan v. Duffs & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435–36 (7th Cir. 1987) (enforcing a
fiduciary duty of disclosure); Libby v. L.J. Corp., 247 F.2d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wendt v. Fischer,
154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (“[D]isclosure . . . must lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or
reservation, in all its stark significance.”); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882 (1988) (arguing that fiduciaries “must be candid”);
Frankel, supra note 29, at 814.
202. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
203. See Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988); Herring v. Offutt, 295 A.2d
876, 879 (Md. 1972); AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS 452 (4th ed. 1987).
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According to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, for example,
judges must disclose the receipt of “gifts and other things of value.”204
Underlying these rules and similar state law regulations is the basic principle
that judges as fiduciaries are subject to disclosure and accounting demands. The
fiduciary duty of candor similarly reflects—while also helping to better
orient—our understanding of judicial honesty. The idea that judges ought, in
general terms, to be honest is intuitive and uncontroversial. The contours of that
command, however, have been the locus of some recent controversy—a
controversy we think fiduciary principles can help to illuminate.205
A full-fledged rehearsal of the entire debate over judicial candor—there
are many arguments for206 and against207—is beyond the scope of this Essay.
But understanding judges as fiduciaries, and their concomitant duty of candor,
would seem to reaffirm the widespread conventional wisdom that judges should
be forthright in their opinion writing, explaining honestly why they are
deciding as they are.208 Although this demand may be subject to limited
204. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 4(H)(3) (2009). The Code incorporates
by reference similar (though more complex and detailed) accounting principles embodied in the Ethics
Reform Act of 1989 and other applicable statutes, regulations, and directives.
205. For the main arguments in the debate, see Paul Butler, When Judges Lie (and When They
Should), 91 MINN. L. REV. 1785 (2007); Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May
Legal Decision-Makers Lie, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091 (2010); Idleman, supra note 16; Robert A.
Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721 (1979); Schwartzman, supra note 19; David
L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989). Idleman acknowledges in a
footnote, after calling judges fiduciaries, that “one of the fundamental duties of a fiduciary is to be
candid.” Idleman, supra note 16, at 1331 n.70. Still, he ultimately furnishes a reason for derogating
from the candor norm, based in his theory of “prudentialism.” Id. at 1395. Although he acknowledges
that if one takes the fiduciary model seriously there is a prima facie reason to require candor, Idleman
fails to abide by his own characterization of the judge as fiduciary because he thinks that a fiduciary’s
discretion allows him or her to choose whether to be candid. Id. at 1331 n.70. Our view is that although
it is possible to imagine exceptions to fiduciary’s duty of candor, those exceptions cannot be
bootstrapped by using fiduciary “discretion,” as Idleman has it: it is the discretion that the fiduciary
status affords that goes some way to creating the duty of candor in the first place.
206. See Schwartzman, supra note 19, at 989 (“Proponents of greater candor in the courts have
argued that transparent decision making constrains the exercise of judicial power, makes judges more
accountable to the law, provides better guidance to lower courts and litigants, promotes trust and
reduces public cynicism, and strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.”) (citations
omitted).
207. See id. at 988–89 (noting that opponents of candor argue that it must “be sacrificed to
maintain the perceived legitimacy of the judiciary; to obtain public compliance with controversial
judgments; to secure preferred outcomes through strategic action on multimember courts; to promote
the clarity, coherence, and continuity of legal doctrine; to avoid the destructive consequences of openly
recognizing ‘tragic choices’ between conflicting moral values; to preserve collegiality and civility in
the courts; and to prevent the unnecessary proliferation of separate opinions. More generally, critics
argue that a ‘purist’ emphasis on the need for honesty in judicial decision making ignores the myriad
institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the ‘prudential’
functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity or candor is said to be
naïve, foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian”) (citations omitted).
208. The argument that political leaders should be subject to a general duty of candor is nicely
explored in and endorsed by JEFFREY EDWARD GREEN, THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRACY IN
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exceptions and limitations (because fiduciary duties are always benchmarks
rather than perfectly rigid commands that apply identically in all contexts), the
duty of candor instructs that judges should say what they mean and not
shoehorn ideological reasoning into doctrinal obfuscation.209
Here it is worth noting that the judicial discretion afforded by judges’
fiduciary status should not include the discretion about being honest. The
discretion may not be used to circumvent a fiduciary obligation that exists in
part to cabin that discretion and hold the fiduciary to account, enabling
beneficiaries to monitor their fiduciaries effectively. Honest judicial opinions
are a “concession to democracy—to the exercise of elitist power . . . by
explaining and attempting to justify decrees imposed on the majority.”210 Even
in jurisdictions with elected judiciaries, judicial opinions serve as the record
upon which voters are able to evaluate and decide whether an individual judge
deserves to be reelected or retained.
B. The Public Fiduciary’s Duty of Deliberative Engagement
Although the public fiduciary and her private law corollary share many
similarities, each role’s fiduciary obligations differ somewhat. Thus far, we
have explored those basic fiduciary duties that have private law analogues. But
we believe judges also have fiduciary obligations that flow uniquely from their
role as public fiduciaries. These obligations are rooted in certain deliberative
virtues implicated by fiduciary law.
In prior work, two of us have described the public fiduciary’s dialogic
imperative, which extends to beneficiaries and imposes on a public fiduciary
the obligation of “deliberative engagement”—that is, an affirmative duty to
engage in dialogue with those whose interests the public fiduciary
AGE OF SPECTATORSHIP (2010). Green, however, does not utilize the fiduciary principle in
pursuing his argument.
209. None of this argument is intended to derogate from the independent reasons for judicial
candor, some of which reinforce the fiduciary duty of candor. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE
INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT’S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE
CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND 7 (1992) (“[T]he Court is
obligated to provide in its communications to Us, the governed and the governors, a basis for
discovering ‘faults’ in the Constitution and for deliberating and deciding whether to speak out and to
seek the correction of its ‘errors.’”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV.
991, 991 (1997) (noting the importance of the people understanding what behavior is expected of them
based upon prior judgments of the courts); Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism:
Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 747 (2006) (“By disclosing the ostensible
justifications for a court’s decision, an opinion enables the various audiences to which it is directed to
monitor the court’s performance and act in response to it.”) Our argument here is only that fiduciary
status actually entails candor, whatever other reasons there may be for or against it.
210. Ray Forrester, Supreme Court Opinions—Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 173 (1995); see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978) (“[T]he fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by
reasoned opinions. Without such opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their participation in
the decision has been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken into account their proofs
and arguments.”).
AN
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representative holds in trust.211 Consider the following principles in fiduciary
law that hint at this obligation: (1) fiduciaries are supposed to receive informed
consent to ensure their compliance with the duty of loyalty and remain beyond
censure; (2) the duty of care requires reasoned courses of action; (3) a fiduciary
needs some knowledge of beneficiaries’ preferences and interests to do a good
job as a fiduciary when entrusted to make decisions on their behalf; and (4) the
duties of disclosure and accounting have dialogic underpinnings, which require
iterative communication to facilitate monitoring those with wide discretion.212
Deliberative engagement is, accordingly, a duty rooted in the principles of
fiduciary law. This duty requires an authentic effort to uncover preferences
rather than a mere hypothetical projection of what beneficiaries might want.
Without requiring that public fiduciaries actually seek to discover their
beneficiaries’ preferences, fiduciary representatives will remain too
unconstrained and will likely assume that their own interests align with those
they estimate belong to their beneficiaries. To be sure, fiduciaries may always
choose their expert assessment of the people’s interests over the people’s own,
but only after they account for the beneficiaries’ preferences and assessments.
Without being genuinely open to beneficiary preferences and to persuasion, a
public fiduciary remains dangerously unmoored from the source of her
authorization.
The duty of deliberative engagement, although developed originally to
explore the public fiduciary role of executive and legislative branch officials,
can be applied to those in judicial office, who also hold their office in trust for
the people. It is controversial to think of “the people” as the judiciary’s
“constituency” (and that constituency can shift depending on whether a court is
hearing a local, state, or federal matter).213 But judges’ fiduciary relationship
with the people suggests similar relational duties of deliberative engagement.214
How, then, should we understand the fiduciary duty of deliberative
engagement for judges? Common judicial practices already evince plausible
applications of the deliberative engagement requirement: oral arguments; case
briefing; open courtrooms; written, intelligible, and widely accessible opinions
in a large class of cases; published and citable decisions in the vast majority of
cases;215 and liberal standards for amicus curiae participation. These examples
211. See Leib & Ponet, supra note 14; Ponet & Leib, supra note 22.
212. See Leib & Ponet, supra note 14, at 188–90; Ponet & Leib, supra note 22, at 1255–59.
213. It is no accident—but still an oversight—that one of the most important recent books to
appear about the idea of constituency does not discuss the judiciary. See ANDREW REHFELD, THE
CONCEPT OF CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (2005). Still, the judicial politics literature does not hesitate to think of judges
as representatives. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial
Politics in the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485 (1995).
214. See Peters, supra note 113, at 347 (describing the deliberative relationship between
judges and litigants).
215. For an argument that this command flows from judges’ trustee status (a trustee is a
paradigmatic fiduciary), see Cravens, supra note 106. Our argument differs from hers because she
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validate the judge’s role as a fiduciary subject to the dialogic imperative. The
next two Parts move beyond these basic features of the judicial process,
however, and explore some more controversial applications of the public
fiduciary duty of deliberative engagement. First, we articulate some possible
demands of deliberative output—the duty to report to beneficiaries in a way
that facilitates understanding, engagement, and monitoring. Second, we explore
some possible demands of deliberative input—the duty to engage authentically
and responsively with beneficiaries on matters within the scope of the fiduciary
relationship.
1. Deliberative Output
The central means of communication that judges as fiduciaries employ to
fulfill their duty of deliberative engagement with the public is through
published, publicly accessible judicial opinions.216 Yet the foundation for a
deliberative judicial output is comprehensible and intelligible judicial opinions;
meaningful dialogue is impossible without some degree of mutual
understanding. That dialogue is important both to monitor and bond with the
judiciary.
A basic problem arises, however, for courts under a duty of deliberative
engagement: complex legal rules and doctrines are difficult to communicate to
“the people,” who have very limited legal knowledge.217 The noted verbosity
and lack of clarity in the Roberts Court’s opinions have likely exacerbated this
problem.218 It is important to be intelligible to litigating parties, but judges also
have duties to “the people.” Yet if the judge is under obligation to engage in
deliberation with “the people,” she will struggle to address adequately the range
of arguments at play in any given case.219 The fiduciary obligation of
deliberative engagement suggests reforms sensitive to the public’s low levels of

depersonalizes the beneficiary, rendering it as the “corpus” of “the common law” itself. For the
counterintuitive argument that the practice of publishing written opinions might actually produce
worse decision making, see Chad Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial
Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1287–88 (2008). Although there may be costs to written opinions,
beneficiaries must incur some costs to enable the monitoring function of the judicial hierarchy.
216. As Robert Leflar once noted, “Judicial opinions are the voices of our courts, and they
serve the purposes that the courts serve.” Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial
Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 819 (1961).
217. Serota, supra note 22, at 659–61; Serota, supra note 20, at 1658–61.
218. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of
U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621 (2008) (explaining the increasing length of
Supreme Court opinions through empirical analysis); Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but
Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1 (noting the lack of clarity in many of the
opinions issued by the Roberts Court).
219. For a meditation on the many different audiences for judicial opinions, see Abner J.
Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357 (1988).
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legal knowledge220—a reality that brevity and clarity of opinions might not be
able to address.
As one of us has explained elsewhere, an attractive approach to solving
this problem is through a two-tiered system of publication whereby courts hire
a civic educator to translate judicial opinions to accommodate the intellect,
educational background, and time constraints of the average American.221 To
wit, a judicial “ombudsperson” could summarize and clarify what the courts are
doing for the public’s benefit.222 We would not want to see the press (the
proverbial “fourth branch”) shirking its role of holding public fiduciaries to
account because it becomes crowded out by the ombudsperson. But the
judiciary itself could, as an institution, make a better effort to communicate
with the public—at its level.223
An ombudsperson could not, and should not, completely take over
fiduciary tasks, however. As we argued earlier, delegating tasks to others can
lead to fiduciary default, as when judges have their clerks write opinions
without careful oversight. But it is uncontroversial for fiduciaries to enlist the
help of others who may be better at a relevant task within the scope of the
job.224 Minor delegation can help judges meet their deliberative engagement
requirement, while simultaneously vindicating their duties to explain the bases
for their decisions fully and honestly.225
220. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 217. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional
Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1371 (2004) (noting that “low level[s] of political knowledge among
American citizens is one of the best-established findings in all social science”).
221. Serota, supra note 22, at 662–69.
222. The use of an ombudsperson to fulfill some deliberative obligations of fiduciaries is
explored at length in Leib & Ponet, supra note 14, at 192–98.
223. It is still worth pointing out that the mainstream media’s coverage of the judiciary
regularly falls short of keeping the people informed as to the range of issues before the Supreme Court,
let alone the lower courts. See Serota, supra note 22, at 665 (noting that “misrepresentation pervades
newsmagazine, newspaper, and television news stories” covering the Supreme Court); Elliot E.
Slotnick, Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decision Making: Problems and Prospects, 75
JUDICATURE 128, 131 (1991) (“Commentary has been frequent in criticism of the press for its
coverage of the judiciary.”); Rorie L. Spill & Zoe M. Oxley, Philosopher Kings or Political Actors?
How the Media Portray the Supreme Court, 87 JUDICATURE 22, 23, 28 (2003) (finding that “media
coverage is a poor reflection of the Supreme Court’s docket” and that “[t]his misrepresentation of the
Court’s docket is present in newsmagazine, newspaper, and television news stories”).
224. See FRANKEL, supra note 54, at 130–31.
225. It is worth noting that the Canadian Supreme Court employs an Executive Legal Officer
(“ELO”) specifically tasked with assisting Canadian journalists in their reporting of the Court’s
opinions. As Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman, and David Taras explain, during the 1980s,
journalists regularly complained about “the complex and abstract legal language” employed by
Canadian Supreme Court Justices, and more generally, criticized the overall unintelligibility of their
work. FLORIAN SAUVAGEAU ET AL., THE LAST WORD: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA 200 (2006). In response to these complaints, the Court created the ELO position, which,
in addition to assisting the Court with various administrative tasks and writing speeches for the
justices, acts “as the liaison between the court and the news media.” Id. at 201. The position of ELO is
normally filled by a member of a law faculty in Canada. And while the ELO is a court employee, it
nonetheless operates in its liaison role with substantial independence from the justices. As Sauvageu,
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2. Deliberative Input
The fiduciary model requires that judges communicate with their
beneficiaries to ensure wide access and public comprehension. Equally
important is the ear that judges owe the people and other branches of
government. Deliberative engagement is a two-way street, which means that
what nonlitigants have to say about cases and controversies deserves more than
just lip service from the judiciary. The fiduciary model as applied to judges
confirms that public opinion can, under certain conditions, play a role in
judicial decision making. Yet we do not think that a fiduciary model turns
judges into mere pollsters of the people or legislature. Rather, deliberative
engagement entails thought, consideration, and, ultimately, a reasoned decision
that accounts for the class of beneficiaries implicated in any given case. But
since the class of beneficiaries can vary from case to case, we must consider
constitutional, statutory, and common law cases separately.
a. Constitutional Cases
The notion that judges have some obligation to “listen” to the people
when interpreting the Constitution has pervaded constitutional theory for
centuries,226 most recently, under the guise of popular constitutionalism.227
Popular constitutionalists emphasize the important role that public opinion and
social movements have played,228 and, more centrally, ought to play, in
Schneiderman, and Taras put it, ELOs “are not there to defend, editorialize, embellish, or spin what the
justices have said,” but rather “are positioned as neutral and independent experts; they explain the law,
describe the options the justices face, and point journalists to the key parts of decisions.” Id. at 201–02.
Thanks to Paul Horwitz for the suggestion.
This is surely both a notable reform and a step in the right direction for enhancing the
intelligibility of judicial opinions. And yet, it is still one step removed from what the benchmark of
deliberative engagement calls for: accessible judicial communication by the Court directed at the
people themselves.
226. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 108 (noting that where there is no clear legal answer, a
judge has “a duty to conform to the accepted standards of the community”); JED RUBENFELD,
FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 58 (2001) (pointing to
other judges and scholars, such as William Brennan, Terrence Sandalow, and Harry Wellington, who
thought courts should look to public opinion in deciding cases); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (1890) (“[A]s soon as we recognize the
present will of the people as the living source of law, we are obliged, in construing the law, to follow,
and give effect to, the present intentions and meaning of the people.”).
227. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Larry D.
Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5 (2001); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
228. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009);
Epstein & Martin, supra note 21; Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and
Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004). But see Tom Goldstein & Amy Howe,
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developing constitutional law.229 Popular constitutionalists are not monolithic,
and views differ within the camp on how authoritative popular constitutional
interpretations should be.230 But, intramural disputes aside, even the most
modest popular constitutionalists still reserve a central role for public opinion
in the development of constitutional law,231 however difficult it is to know
exactly who “the people” are and what they believe.232
Notwithstanding the impressive growth of popular constitutionalism in the
academy,233 popular constitutionalism has its critics. The proposition that the
public should have a say in contested matters of constitutional interpretation—
thereby making public opinion a legitimate source of constitutional authority—
is quite controversial.234 There is, most essentially, a theoretical lacuna in the
popular constitutionalist view: although theorists have demonstrated that public
opinion seems to play a role in the resolution of at least some constitutional
cases,235 they have not specified the ways the partnership between judges and
the people ought to function and why.236 We think the fiduciary model can help
fill that gap.
The public fiduciary principle of “deliberative engagement” reinforces
both judicial responsiveness and judicial independence. That is, the judge as
fiduciary must listen to the public in constitutional cases, but need not feel
bound by any one voice, or even a large majority screaming in unison. The
bifurcated nature of this obligation is the product of two crosscutting fiduciary
But How Will the People Know? Public Opinion as a Meager Influence in Shaping Contemporary
Supreme Court Decision Making, 109 MICH. L. REV. 963, 967 (2011) (noting that, contrary to
Friedman’s account, “the Supreme Court’s modern constitutional jurisprudence overwhelmingly does
not correspond to a model in which decisions generate a public debate, to which the Justices then
adapt”); Pildes, supra note 21, at 155 (similarly rejecting the notion that the Court is a majoritarian
institution).
229. See generally sources cited supra note 227.
230. See Pozen, supra note 24, at 2060–64; Serota, supra note 20, at 1641.
231. See Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122
HARV. L. REV. F. 108, 109 (2011), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124_blocher.pdf
(noting that “[t]hough accounts of popular constitutionalism vary in their particulars, they are all
connected by the notion that ‘the people’ have a role to play in constitutional interpretation”); see also
Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1050
n.26 (2004) (explaining that popular constitutionalism is “the view that the people should have a major
role to play in constitutional interpretation”).
232. For arguments about how difficult it is to draw a circle around the people and how
difficult it is to know their opinions, see generally Pildes, supra note 21.
233. Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by
Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213, 238 (2007) (“[P]opular
constitutionalism . . . has taken constitutional theory by storm over the last decade.”).
234. See e.g., Alexander & Solum, supra note 4.
235. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 228; Friedman, supra note 228.
236. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2006) (asking how
popular constitutionalism can be implemented effectively); Serota, supra note 20, at 1645 (noting the
failure of popular constitutionalists to answer these questions); Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law Back
in Constitutional Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 461, 463 (2009) (arguing that popular constitutionalists
have not explained how their theory works in practice).
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directives: first, that judges remain attentive to the expressed will of their
beneficiaries; and, second, that judges embrace their discretion to ascertain the
public’s interest within constitutional parameters. As a result, the judge as
fiduciary neither can ignore public opinion where it “seems clear, widespread,
and of constitutional dimension,” nor unilaterally establish it as the binding rule
of decision.237 Indeed, the judicial independence inherent in the judge-asfiduciary model means that the judge’s role is necessarily something more than
a mere delegate who acts according to the polls.238
While the notion that public opinion can play an authoritative role in the
resolution of constitutional cases is highly controversial,239 it is also important
to acknowledge the limited scope of the recommendation: public opinion will
meet the prerequisites necessary to make it relevant to the outcome only
infrequently. This is because, as various commentators have noted, the people
simply do not possess an identifiable opinion on most constitutional issues that
confront our courts.240 Yet the fiduciary model requires that in those instances
where public opinion does intelligibly emerge, judges should consider public
opinion as one source of constitutional meaning among others.241 In this way,
237. Pozen, supra note 24, at 2082. Richard Primus makes a similar point, noting that the
“strongly held view of the public,” where it is “something closer to consensus than to simple majority
preference . . . can be an ingredient in the right answer to a constitutional question.” Richard Primus,
Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (2010) [hereinafter
Primus, Public Consensus]; see also Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in Constitutional
Adjudication, 13 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 18–20 (2007).
238. David Pozen notes the variety of ways in which judges may value public opinion in the
decision-making process without being “mere conduits for public opinion.” Pozen, supra note 24, at
2082. Judges might, for example, constrain the use of public opinion to cases in which “the legal
answer seems uncertain . . . in construing a vague standard such as ‘equal protection’ or ‘due
process’ . . . to supplement or gloss the traditional interpretive aids . . . [or to be used] when the original
meaning of a provision is obscure or when the orthodox legal materials are in equipoise . . . .” Id.
239. See, e.g., Gail Pison Montany, Aspen Ideas Festival: Should the Supreme Court Follow
the People?, ASPEN BUS. J. (June 29, 2011, 11:27 pm), http://www.aspenbusinessjournal.com/
article.php?id=5536 (noting that Justice Stephen Breyer and former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
vehemently disagree with the notion that “a judge’s decision would be influenced by public opinion”).
It should be noted that Justice O’Connor also made it clear during the discussion that—to
paraphrase—judges read newspapers, suggesting that the press is used to decipher what public opinion
on a subject might be.
240. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1549 (2010) (noting that “it seems unlikely that there are strong
public feelings about those decisions”); Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State
Supreme Courts, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 476–77 (2010) (stating the public is likely unaware of
state supreme court decisions); Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate
Premises, 80 HARV. L. REV. 986, 994 (1967) (stating that there is no “general thinking” on many of
the legal issues that come before courts); Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 237, at 1222 (noting
that “[m]ost Americans have no view about most of the constitutional issues that present themselves in
court” and that “[t]his is especially true of the species of issue that involves parsing and implementing
constitutional clauses or precedential doctrines”).
241. Obviously, the doctrine of stare decisis is another authoritative source of constitutional
decision making—and in lower courts, that doctrine is likely often to be outcome determinative,
rendering public opinion a less powerful source of authority. Adhering to the duty of care—and
abiding precedent seems to be part and parcel of that command—will often be a more important and
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the fiduciary model provides a normative foundation for the authoritative status
of popular constitutional interpretations. The fiduciary model also allows
populism to coexist with judicial independence from majoritarian pressure in
the resolution of legal disputes.242
b. Statutory Cases
Matters change when we analyze statutory interpretation in light of the
fiduciary model. In this configuration, elected representatives share an
intervening fiduciary relationship with the public, which dictates that the duty
of deliberative engagement applies somewhat differently. When interpreting
statutes, the fiduciary judge is not as concerned with public opinion directly as
she is with the expressed will of the public’s own policy-making fiduciary: the
legislature.243
As we explained earlier, the fiduciary model applies beyond the exercise
of judicial power. The people and their elected representatives in the legislature
also share a fiduciary relationship. This means that both state and federal
legislative officeholders, in their roles as democratic representatives, owe the
public a similar cluster of fiduciary obligations. These obligations demand that
members of the legislature deliberatively engage their constituencies
authentically and meaningfully.244 Maintaining this vital dialogue not only

reliable course of action than measuring and abiding public opinion. Still, in matters of grave public
concern, if the public has a view that precedent should be overturned, the judicial fiduciary must weigh
that in the balance.
242. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1015 (explaining that a pure popular constitutionalist
system would “erod[e] constitutional protections for unpopular, marginalized groups”). As Justice
Robert Jackson once noted, “Unrestricted majority rule leaves the individual in the minority
unprotected. This is the dilemma [between pure populism and antimajoritarianism] and you have to
take your choice. The Constitution-makers made their choice in favor of a limited majority rule.”
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 79 (1955).
See also FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 30 (applauding those instances where the Supreme Court
“has . . . stood up for fundamental rights that any democracy should respect” notwithstanding the
antipopulism inherent in those decisions). Cf. Amy Gutmann, How Not to Resolve Moral Conflicts in
Politics, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 4–5 (1999) (“Decisions that violate basic liberty and
opportunity cannot be justified simply by virtue of the fact that they result from majority rule. Majority
rule may still be the best procedural standard for resolving many political disputes, but there is no
reason to believe that it is a sufficient standard.”).
243. Glen Staszewski has astutely observed that perhaps matters are not so different in
constitutional cases. After all, constitutional law is largely about determining the validity and legality
of state actors who are themselves under fiduciary obligations. This seems just right to us—except that
the judicial role in this class of cases is to make an independent judgment about what the constitution,
as the voice of the people, requires. In constitutional cases, the rule of deference to mediating
fiduciaries applies sometimes—this may be an interesting way to think about Thayerian deference, see
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (1893), but the conventional picture from The Federalist 78 does not use this structure for
constitutional review of official action.
244. See Leib & Ponet, supra note 14, at 189–90.
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safeguards the public trust in government but also promotes the democratic
pedigree of the laws that are passed.245
Accordingly, in statutory interpretation cases, the fiduciary relationship
shared between the legislature and the public intervenes, enabling the
legislature to serve as the primary beneficiary on behalf of the public. Just as
the legislature acts as the people’s fiduciary when passing laws, the judiciary
acts as the legislature’s fiduciary when interpreting those laws. It is
commonplace to understand the judiciary as an “agent” for the legislatorprincipal,246 and agency is a conventional fiduciary relationship.247
As a result of this complex architecture in the statutory context, public
opinion no longer retains the same potentially authoritative status it does in the
context of constitutional interpretation. But it does not become completely
irrelevant, either. The unique fiduciary relationship that judges share with
lawmaking bodies shifts the primary focus to the legislative will. Therefore, in
those instances where the legislature has failed in its fiduciary capacity, the
judge as fiduciary may look to the people, the ultimate beneficiary, directly.248
Obeisance to the legislature forces judges to conduct restrained
interpretations that hew as closely as possible to the legislative text, and, more
generally, to the overarching principle and conventional posture of legislative
supremacy.249 Thus, where the statutory language provides a clear answer to
the legal issue before the court, the judge’s fiduciary obligation generally
demands that she apply it. And in more challenging cases, where judges
confront the myriad textual ambiguities in local, state, and federal laws,250 the
judge-as-fiduciary must attempt to discern to the extent possible the legislative
will underlying the statute. Justice Breyer labels this approach, which
emphasizes congressional purposes and consequences, the key to “maintaining

245. See id. at 191.
246. See Merrill, supra note 9, at 1566–70.
247. See Smith, supra note 26, at 1400.
248. Although we ignore administrative agency implementation of legislative commands in
what follows, if administrative officers are also fiduciaries, similar principles of deference are
appropriate. The law and scholarship on the fiduciary nature of administrative authority is not to the
contrary. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Criddle, Administration, supra note 14; Criddle, Foundations, supra note 14.
249. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
250. These ambiguities are a necessary result of factors such as congressional time constraints
and shortsightedness, political compromise, and the limitations of the English language. See ROBERT
A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 61 (1997) (offering several reasons for statutory ambiguity);
Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2007) (noting the
various reasons for ambiguity in statutes); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) (explaining that the “basic
reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is not that they are poorly drafted—
though many are—and not that the legislators failed to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish
in the statute—though often they do fail—but that a statute necessarily is drafted in advance of, and
with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application”).
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a strong workable relationship with Congress.”251 We think that the structural
dynamics underlying the fiduciary model reinforce Justice Breyer’s position.
Of course, in some statutory cases, legislative purposes and intent may be
out of reach given unique facts or circumstances. When the legislative will is
inscrutable, the fiduciary judge must then look to “considerations drawn from
some broadly based conception of the public interest,”252 a principle that finds
normative justification in the judiciary’s relationship to the beneficiary behind
the beneficiary, as it were: “the people” themselves. The principle of legislative
supremacy is defeasible, then, even when legislators try in good faith to meet
their own fiduciary obligations.
But what about when judges have a reasonable suspicion that legislators
cannot meet their own fiduciary obligations or are failing to live up to fiduciary
standards? Because legislative supremacy results from the legislature’s
fiduciary relationship with the public, the mandate of legislative deference
recedes in situations where the interests of judges’ ultimate beneficiaries are no
longer protected. These situations require judges to reengage in direct fiduciary
protection of the public through their decision making. Thus, where old statutes
no longer reflect current majorities, where legislators are particularly likely to
be engaged in aggrandizement or conflicts of interest (e.g., campaign finance,
lobbying, election law), where public-choice pathologies suggest democratic
deficits, or where representation reinforcement is vital, the judge as fiduciary
would be justified in looking to the public will, either through contemporary
public opinion or public values more generally, for interpretive guidance.253 In
this way, the authoritative status of public opinion is substantially attenuated in
matters of statutory interpretation as compared to constitutional law but does
not wholly disappear.254
The fiduciary model can illuminate the application of certain interpretive
canons that might better facilitate interbranch deliberative engagement, as well.
The judicial application of “super-strong” stare decisis to statutory precedents
provides a paradigmatic dialogue-enhancing canon.255 As both the Supreme
251. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 88 (2010).
252. Posner, supra note 250, at 820.
253. As Judge Ruggero Aldisert puts it: “Where the legislature has not acted in accordance
with changing social policies and seemingly does not so intend to act, the courts have not only the
authority, but possibly the duty, to keep pace with the change in consensus.” Ruggero J. Aldisert,
Judicial Declaration of Public Policy, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 229, 239 (2009); see also Hillel Y.
Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
1103.
254. Indeed, this interplay between legislative deference and, where necessary, legislative
discipline, harkens back to Hamilton’s words in The Federalist 78 explaining that the proper role of
the courts is to function “as an intermediate body between the people and the legislature,” which keeps
“the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 394 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
255. See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2008); Einer Elhauge,
Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2226 (2002) (citing Square D
Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 n.34 (1986)) (noting that “[t]he
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Court and a variety of commentators have pointed out, respecting statutory
precedents gives Congress an important incentive to override disfavored
precedents.256 This incentive, in turn, generates a fruitful “court-congressional
dialogue”257 that keeps the legislature focused on its representative law-making
duties and its fiduciary obligations.
c. Common Law Cases
Throughout our nation’s legal history, American jurists have struggled
with the tension between the common law and democracy.258 To understand
why, one need only look to The Federalist, in which James Madison provided
the following insight: “Were the power of judging joined with the legislative,
the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul, for the
judge would then be the legislator.”259 From Madison’s perspective, “the
uncomfortable relationship of common-law lawmaking to democracy” is
apparent.260 How can rules promulgated through the common law, which lack
the democratic provenance of the legislative process, and which complicate the
separation of powers, be legitimate?
Democratic principles suggest that legislators, not judges, should usually
be responsible for the public policy decisions that common law cases
necessarily entail.261 As Matthew Steilen explains, “democratic law is
legitimate because we decided on the law, and we can hardly complain about
being bound by law we decided on”; but “in common-law adjudication, it is the
judge who decides on the content of the law, not the people bound by that
blackletter rule is that statutory precedents have especially strong stare decisis effect”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (using the term “superstrong” stare decisis).
256. Elhauge, supra note 255, at 2226 (citing NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 473 U.S.
61, 84 (1985); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 n.5 (1985); Williams v. Crickman,
405 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1980); City of Boston v. Mac-Gray Co., 359 N.E.2d 946, 948 (Mass. 1977);
Higby v. Mahoney, 396 N.E.2d 183, 184–86 (N.Y. 1979); James v. Vernon Calhoun Packing Co., 498
S.W.2d 160, 162–63 (Tex. 1973)); see also Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case
for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 183 (1989). As the Supreme
Court itself has noted, by giving statutory precedents “special force,” Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989), judges incentivize Congress “to exercise its responsibility to correct
statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair,” Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 296 (1996).
257. See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 428 (1992) (describing an empirical study
confirming the value of a strong form of statutory stare decisis in promoting a “court-congressional
dialogue”).
258. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 10 (1997); Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (1836), in KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 317, 317–18 (1991).
259. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 247 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
260. SCALIA, supra note 258, at 10.
261. See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 253, at 231 (noting that “courts are continually called upon
to weigh considerations of public policy when adding to the content of the common law”); Roger J.
Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 749 (1970) (noting that judges also make
policy decisions in common law cases).
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law . . . . For this reason, judge-made law lacks the special legitimacy that
distinguishes democratic law.”262 Or as Justice Holmes once put it, common
law adjudication boils down to “considerations of what is expedient for the
community”—considerations of a quintessential lawmaking nature.263 While
the substantial judicial discretion required in common law decision making
appears to challenge democracy, a fiduciary model—and specifically, the duty
of deliberative engagement—helps slacken the ostensible tension between
common law adjudication and democratic legitimacy.
Notably, in the context of common law adjudication, the public serves as
the direct structural beneficiary in relation to the judge as fiduciary. No
intervening fiduciary relationship exists, as with statutory interpretation. The
relationship between judges and the public is actually the most direct here,
since in constitutional cases, courts usually review governmental action. And
unlike the constraints judges-as-fiduciaries face when interpreting constitutions
and statutes, judges enjoy wide discretion in the common law context owing to
a lack of a publicly ratified or duly enacted text.
For these reasons, the duty of deliberative engagement is even more
stringent here.264 Public opinion can thus serve as a legitimate source of
authority in the resolution of common law cases.265 As the fiduciary judge
adjudicates common law cases, she must maintain a vigorous dialogue with the
public. She must be sensitive to both the arguments of the litigants before her,
and, where relevant, to the public’s interest. And ultimately she must issue
transparent judicial opinions based on publicly accessible and meaningful
reasons that reasonable persons could regard as justificatory.
In short, by comporting with her duty of deliberative engagement, the
judge-as-fiduciary maintains a vital responsiveness to the public beneficiary—
the touchstone of democratic legitimacy.266 If, as Joshua Cohen suggests,
“[d]emocracy is a way of making collective decisions that connects decisions to
the interests and the judgments of those whose conduct is to be regulated by the

262. Matthew Steilen, Democratic Common Law, 2011 J. JURISPRUDENCE 437, 448 (2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1872445 (discussing the democratic
problems with placing lawmaking powers in the hands of judges).
263. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 34–36 (Harvard University Press
2009) (1881).
264. See Benjamin J. Roesch, Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of
Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 407–08 (2006) (noting that since the
judiciary actively creates law in the common law context, “democratic values suggest that the people
should have a voice in determining what that law is”).
265. See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 253, at 239 (noting that “the courts have not only the
authority, but possibly the duty, to keep pace with the change in consensus” in the development of the
common law); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 236 (1973) (noting that public opinion should be relevant in
the development of the common law).
266. See Steilen, supra note 262, at 439 (describing responsiveness to those to whom one’s
decisions apply as the “hallmark of democratic legitimacy”).
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decisions,”267 then the common law lawmaking process, viewed through the
fiduciary model’s duty of deliberative engagement, is credibly democratic.
Before concluding, one final point is in order. It is important to
acknowledge that the realities of judicial administration are such that not all
cases will neatly fit into one of the aforementioned three categories. Judges will
routinely encounter statutory cases that involve common law issues, common
law statutes that require interpretation, or instances where statutes and common
law issues come up against a federal or state constitution. These complexities,
however, are by no means fatal to the structural paradigms discussed in this
Part. The different demands of judges in the different types of cases that we
have traced here are only guideposts to help judges wade through a complex
mix of requirements that their fiduciary status creates. Still, we hope these
baselines provide judges with an important compass, even if they do not always
establish a precise map, for resolving constitutional, statutory, and common law
problems in their role as a public fiduciary in a democratic state.
CONCLUSION
We’ve attempted here a project of recovery. The idea of judges as
fiduciaries presented in this Essay has deep roots in political philosophy and
American political thought that have faded from full view. Why and how this
vision of judging became occluded is not our current concern.268 But this
account has proven its continuing vitality and utility: the judges-as-fiduciaries
model helps explain and guide the proper standards of judicial conduct, a
subject that has become hugely contentious in the current political
environment. The fiduciary principle also reveals how the judiciary’s
countermajoritarian structure can be rendered compatible with a deep
commitment to democratic governance, linking judges and “the people” in a
relationship of discretion, trust, and vulnerability. By showing how the
fiduciary principle supervenes over all classes of judges (state, federal, elected,
and appointed), this Essay sheds light on some of the most vexing questions
about the role of judges in American democracy.
Although the judges-as-fiduciaries model offers a rich framework for
thinking about the role of the judge and provides salutary guideposts for
potential reform, it is still only a starting point. This Essay offers only a partial
theory of judging. Nothing we have argued here denies the real differences
among judges, the reality of judicial hierarchy and bureaucracy, and the need
267. JOSHUA COHEN, Reflections on Deliberative Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS,
DEMOCRACY 326, 329 (2009); see also Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative
Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 407, 407 (James
Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (“The fundamental idea of democratic legitimacy is that the
authorization to exercise state power must arise from the collective decisions of the members of a
society who are governed by that power.”).
268. See generally Finn, The Forgotten Trust, supra note 14, at 131 (“There is a real curiosity
in the collective amnesia we suffered.”).
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for more specific learning about what the rule-of-law may require for litigants.
But we hope we have recovered in part what ties the complex judiciary in our
democracy together—and what ties the judiciary to the people.
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